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Many U.S. laws protect privacy by governing recording. Recently, however,
courts have recognized a First Amendment “right to record.” This Article
addresses how courts should handle privacy laws in light of the developing
First Amendment right to record.
The privacy harms addressed by recording laws are situated harms.
Recording changes the way people behave in physical spaces by altering the
nature of those spaces. Thus, recording laws can be placed within a long line
of First Amendment case law that recognizes a valid government interest in
managing the qualities of rivalrous physical space, so as not to allow one
person’s behavior to disrupt the behavior of others. That interest, importantly,
will not always justify suppressing recording, but it can be distinguished from
an impermissible government interest in suppressing speech. Moreover, the
government’s interest in managing the qualities of a particular environment
can itself be speech-protective—and has been recognized as such.
As technological development brings more recording devices into the
physical world, courts will need to determine how to balance speech interests
and privacy. First Amendment doctrine, often blunt in nature, is in fact, and
perhaps surprisingly, equipped to address the nuances of this challenge.
Regulating recording governs a moment of interaction in physical space, not a
downstream editorial decision that may cause dignitary harms. Regulation,
thus, does not break with the U.S. free speech tradition of protecting the
publication and distribution of information.
INTRODUCTION
Many laws in the United States protect privacy by governing recording.
Wiretap and eavesdropping laws, video voyeurism laws, and a host of new
privacy laws all target the moment at which a recording is made or information
is gathered. Recent cases, however, have recognized a First Amendment “right
to record.”1 While commentators have argued for the existence of this First

1 See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655
F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Our recognition that the First Amendment protects the filming
of government officials in public spaces accords with the decisions of numerous circuit and
district courts.”); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e
agree with the Smiths that they had a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time,
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Amendment right, none have analyzed, at any length, its implications for
privacy laws.2
Privacy governance has always been in tension with the First Amendment.3
Usually, however, that tension has played out around the distribution of
information, not recording or information gathering. Until recently, governing
recording was, in fact, the simplest way to protect privacy in the United States
without triggering First Amendment scrutiny.
Governing the distribution of information interferes with a publisher’s
editorial choices and often requires assessing a reader’s reaction to speech.4
manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct.”).
2 See Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 105 (2014) (arguing that
recording is First Amendment salient, but electing not to set the level of scrutiny that should
apply to privacy laws, as “the answer will depend on context”); Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1079-80 (2015) (arguing that recording,
as a type of speech production, should be protected, but only when it produces information
about a matter of public concern); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First
Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 380-81,
384, 398 (2011) (arguing that recording is protected as an extension of memory, though the
right might be considered waived in private spaces); Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free
Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 997-98 (2016) (arguing
that the First Amendment protects recording even when it occurs in a privately owned
space); see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped):
Reconceiving First Amendment Protection for Information-Gathering in the Age of Google
Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 115, 122 (2012) (discussing how the right to free
expression should include a right to information gathering, and envisioning exceptions for
privacy). See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and
Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2015) (discussing the right to record in
the context of unmanned aerial vehicles). Joel Reidenberg has discussed the right to record
from the perspective of privacy law, and is largely critical of the developing First
Amendment framework, believing that any protection should be limited in scope to
protecting matters of public concern. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 141, 152 (2014).
3 See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 357, 361-65 (2011) [hereinafter Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy] (discussing
the tension between the disclosure tort and the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People
from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000). But see Margot E.
Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of
Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 466-67 (2015) (identifying
studies that suggest that surveillance produces conformity, which has negative implications
for First Amendment freedoms); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV.
387, 393-407 (2008) (arguing that First Amendment values require intellectual privacy
protection); Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2015) [hereinafter Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly)
Constitutional].
4 See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1999)
(finding that California could not restrict access to and use of arrestees’ addresses for
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The Supreme Court suggested in Bartnicki v. Vopper5 that privacy governance
should be aimed at recording, not distribution.6 Where telling a publisher or
speaker to retract lawfully obtained, truthful information implicates the First
Amendment, under Bartnicki, the government can make it unlawful to obtain
information in the first instance, without necessarily invoking First
Amendment scrutiny. The right to record threatens this governance model. The
moment of recording is no longer a First Amendment-free zone.
Courts appear conscious of the deregulatory power of a recording right and
have sought limiting principles. Courts have cabined the scope of the right to
record based on both content and physical location.7 Courts have also proposed
treating the right to record as though it were expressive activity in a physical
space, like a parade.8 This treatment would allow courts to balance privacy
against speech when evaluating recording, rather than strike down most
recording laws under strict scrutiny.
Both current and proposed judicial treatment leads, however, to challenging
questions. First, why is it that the scope of the right to record might differ in
different physical spaces, as courts currently suggest? Second, if recording is
expressive, how does one disentangle a legitimate government interest in
protecting privacy from an impermissible government interest in restricting
speech?
My central claim is that the contours of the protected right to record are
defined by the privacy harms that the right potentially causes. Understanding
the right to record is possible only by properly articulating the privacy interests

commercial purposes, where addresses were available in police reports); Fla. Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (finding unconstitutional the suppression of publication of a rape
victim’s name when the name was accidentally disclosed in a police report); Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (finding suppression of publication of a rape
victim’s name unconstitutional, where the name was publicly available).
5 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
6 Id. at 526-35 (finding that the government could not prohibit downstream publication
of an illegal recording, the content of which was a “matter of public concern,” so long as a
publisher’s hands were clean, but suggesting that the point of recording could still be
governed in the face of the First Amendment).
7 See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he eavesdropping
statute restricts a medium of expression—the use of a common instrument of
communication—and thus an integral step in the speech process. As applied here, it
interferes with the gathering and dissemination of information about government officials
performing their duties in public.”) (emphasis added); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st
Cir. 2011) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the filming of government officials in public
spaces . . . .”) (emphasis added); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.
2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public
officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public
interest.”) (emphases added).
8 See Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 110-38 (applying forum doctrine to airspace in framing
discussion of regulation of drones under the First Amendment).

2017]

PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO RECORD

171

at stake. This claim stands even as the Supreme Court in recent cases has
repeatedly disavowed balancing speech against other nonspeech harms.9
To understand the right to record, then, we must understand the privacy
harm. Privacy can be many things.10 Recording implicates a particular type of
privacy interest that is entwined with physical space.11 Laws that govern
recording enable individuals to dynamically manage their social accessibility
in physical space and over time.12 In order to manage their social accessibility,
people rely on a variety of tactics and circumstances, including: physical walls;
clothing; others’ forgetfulness over time; and physical distance. When the use
of a technology disrupts any of these tactics and circumstances, the
government may have an interest in intervening to prevent undesirable changes
in behavior, including chilling effects on speech.
Understanding privacy as involving both physical and temporal features of
an individual’s environment helps answer the two most difficult questions
about the right to record. First, the scope of the right to record is treated
differently in different physical spaces because the strength of the privacy
interest varies in different physical locations. Courts consequently set doctrinal
defaults that favor privacy in private locations and speech in public locations
(not that private and public are perfectly distinct, but that is the shorthand used
in the doctrine here). Second, a government interest in protecting privacy can
be unrelated to the suppression of speech, if it goes to enabling the successful
management of social accessibility in a physical location, rather than
disfavoring particular types of content or speakers.13 This means that even in

9

See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012).
Daniel Solove has created a complex taxonomy outlining different kinds of privacy.
See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).
11 See Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV.
1113, 1132-35 (2015) (building on the work of social psychologist Irwin Altman in defining
privacy in physical spaces). See generally IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR (1975) (discussing human privacy, crowding, territory, and personal space).
12 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (“Our
interest in privacy . . . is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the extent to
which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the
extent to which we are the subject of others’ attention.”).
13 In United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court set out a test which
requires that government regulation (1) be “within the constitutional power of
[g]overnment”; (2) “further[] an important or substantial governmental interest” that is
unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) incidentally restrict speech no more than is
necessary to further that interest. Id. at 377; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable
restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
10
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public spaces, where the right to record will be more protected, the government
can sometimes articulate an interest in privacy that can withstand analysis
under the intermediate scrutiny usually applied to expressive acts entwined
with physical presence.
The right to record exemplifies a larger concern about current First
Amendment doctrine: As coverage expands, and the doctrine ossifies, First
Amendment protection can serve as a deregulatory tool.14 Alternatively, as
coverage expands, courts might fundamentally alter First Amendment doctrine,
reducing speech protection.15 At first glance, the right to record looks like it
may trigger this looming conflict. As this Article demonstrates, however,
closer inspection of the right to record in fact illuminates existing nuance
within current First Amendment doctrine. It shows that the crisis of First
Amendment expansionism is not always as stark as it may initially appear.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the implications of the
right to record for the future of First Amendment law. Part II discusses whether
recording is speech. Part III characterizes the privacy harm from recording to
explain why recording is properly viewed as a regulable speech-act. Finally,
Part IV explains the interface between privacy and the right to record,
providing examples.
I.

THE EXPANDING FIRST AMENDMENT

First Amendment protection has recently been depicted as ever-expanding
and increasingly blunt. Multiple scholars characterize recent First Amendment
doctrine as extending speech protection into new subject-matter areas, with
litigators taking advantage of the strength of First Amendment protections by
rebranding ordinary economic activity as speech.16 Scholars also worry that the
Supreme Court has ossified First Amendment analysis so that courts use the
doctrine as a hammer, failing to take context into account.17 The result,
according to a number of recent critics, is that the First Amendment has
become a blunt tool of deregulation.18 We should, according to these critics,

14

See infra Part I.
Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1613, 1635 (2015) (discussing how expanding First Amendment coverage
could potentially weaken “existing doctrinal tools”).
16 See Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199,
1200 (2015); Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT:
FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 174, 178 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds.,
2002); Schauer, supra note 15, at 1635.
17 See Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 367 (2014) (“A
better understanding of free speech practice requires thinking that is factored, not formulaic;
contextual, not trans-contextual; dynamic, not static; tentative, not absolutist; plural, not
singular.”).
18 E.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 384 (“Business interests and other conservative
15
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worry about the consequences of expanding First Amendment coverage
because, inevitably, commercial entities will use “speech” protection to escape
a stronger government hand.
These concerns are not entirely misplaced. The Supreme Court in recent
cases appears to have fixed the possible exceptions to First Amendment
protection into a short, historical list.19 The Court has several times now
refused to weigh broader social interests with speech interests to create new
exceptions to First Amendment protection once it has established that a
particular activity is covered by the First Amendment.20 When First
Amendment coverage extends to a particular activity, the fear is that courts
will apply strict scrutiny, which is famously “fatal in fact,” or some other form
of heightened speech scrutiny under which the regulations are doomed to fail.21
This overly blunt approach may derail all kinds of regulatory efforts, from
protection of data privacy to bans on the off-label promotion of drugs.22
Some scholars fear this approach to the First Amendment will lead
inevitably to deregulation. Others, however, see a related problem looming.
They fear that First Amendment expansionism—courts finding speech in more
and more places—will result not in deregulation but in a judicial backlash.23 In
other words, arguing that everything is speech and is thus protected by the First

groups are finding that arguments for property rights and the social status quo can more and
more easily be rephrased in the language of the first amendment . . . .”); Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 286
(2000) (warning that Lochnerism could be revived through First Amendment analysis);
Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 134 (“Commercial interests are
increasingly laying claim, often successfully, to First Amendment protections.”).
19 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing the following as
historically unprotected speech: incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to
criminal conduct, “fighting-words,” child pornography, fraud, true threats, and “speech
presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent”);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (listing obscenity, defamation, fraud,
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct as historically unprotected speech).
20 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546-47 (refusing to create an exception for lies); Stevens,
559 U.S. at 470 (refusing to create an exception for crush videos).
21 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (discussing strict
scrutiny in the context of the Equal Protection Clause); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Dark Side of
the First Amendment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1480, 1485 (2014) (noting that the “Court has
retreated in some recent decisions to an indefensible form of absolutism”). But see Richards,
Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, supra note 3, at 1505 (arguing that data
privacy law generally does not raise First Amendment issues).
22 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011); United States v. Caronia,
703 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a conviction for promoting an FDAapproved drug for off-label use violated the First Amendment under heightened scrutiny).
23 See AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI
THREATEN A FREE PRESS 4 (2015) (predicting a backlash in First Amendment doctrine).
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Amendment will not result in everything being protected; it will result in a
lowering of protection for speech in general.24 Courts will back away from
categorical reasoning and employ balancing tests instead, erasing decades of
doctrinal development that has proven extraordinarily protective for speakers
in the United States.25 In fact, several scholars call explicitly for this approach:
harmonize U.S. free speech law with the law of the rest of the world, balancing
speech against other societal values.26 As a general move, this would represent
an extraordinary change in First Amendment doctrine, erasing years of
doctrinal calibration to protect dissident and unpopular speech.27
Current discussions of the right to record appear at first to fall squarely
within this narrative. First Amendment scholars largely argue for expanding
First Amendment protection to cover a right to record,28 while privacy scholars
fear that the right will become primarily a deregulatory tool.29 These fears are
not misplaced; companies have already used the right to record to argue for
deregulation of automatic license plate readers (“ALPRs”) and drones.30
Several scholars, thus, call for limiting First Amendment protection of the
recording right in various ways.31 Others fear, however, that limits on First

24

See Schauer, supra note 15, at 1635-36.
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791-93 (2011) (applying
United States v. Stevens and firmly rejecting a balancing test, holding instead that the
categorical approach is better).
26 See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 21, at 1497-98 (claiming that except for protection of
dissenting speech, the United States largely gets speech protection wrong while Europe gets
it right); Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2016) (proposing a
balancing test for free speech cases that are “difficult . . . involving competing rights”).
27 Margot E. Kaminski, The First Amendment’s Public Relations Problem: A Response
to Alexander Tsesis’s Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS
103, 106.
28 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 2, at 105; Kreimer, supra note 2, at 380-81, 384, 398;
Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 997-98.
29 See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 153.
30 Dig. Recognition Network Inc. v. Hutchinson, 803 F.3d 952, 954-55 (8th Cir. 2015)
(addressing a lawsuit by manufacturers arguing that the law banning ALPRs violated their
First Amendment rights); Brief of News Media Amici in Support of Respondent Raphael
Pirker at 7-12, Huerta v. Pirker, NTSB Order No. EA-5730 (Nov. 18, 2014) (No. CP-217)
(arguing that an absolute ban on unmanned aerial systems would violate the First
Amendment by interfereing with newsgatherers’ rights).
31 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1065; Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 155; see also
Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 50 (2016)
(advocating an antitargeting approach, which would protect phone cameras and like media,
because “[c]ameras and other audiovisual recording devices are conventional means of
communication—that is, they are conventionally used for communicative purposes” but
would not protect other kinds of recording technologies).
25
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Amendment coverage will enable the government to target information
gathering as a way of preventing speech.32
There is a third way, which does not result in either privacy deregulation or
undercoverage. While the dominant narrative paints the picture of a blunt,
categorical First Amendment, dozens of doctrinal twists regularly allow for the
balancing of speech against other interests.33 Courts assess a wide variety of
First Amendment issues under analyses more closely resembling balancing
tests: time, place, and manner regulations; regulations of symbolic conduct;
regulations of speech by government employees; and much more.34 Even the
distribution of private information may, under Bartnicki, trigger some kind of
balancing test.35 Appellate courts similarly appear prepared to approach the
right to record under some sort of balancing test.
The key question is how to justify this intuition. Why is recording the kind
of thing better approached under a balancing test? Those scholars proposing a
balancing test in this context have not offered an answer, apart from pointing
out that categorically protecting recording will result in privacy deregulation.
We cannot create a categorical right to record, the argument goes, or privacy
will be unprotectable. Other scholars argue that the recording right should be
limited in scope to only matters of public concern, grounding the right in
protection of democratic self-governance.36 This second approach is a sort of
categorical form of balancing: it locks in a particular balance of privacy and
speech by restricting the scope of coverage. But this approach has been
subjected to valid criticism for rejecting or ignoring other theories for why we
protect freedom of speech.
Recording in fact critically resembles the kinds of expression, expressive
acts, or penumbral rights ordinarily subjected to First Amendment balancing
tests rather than categorical analysis. However, we can see that recording is
more akin to expressive acts like parades than disembodied words on the
printed page only if we understand the nature of the government interest. And
the government can regulate to protect privacy only if we can distinguish that
interest in privacy protection from impermissible interests in regulating the
content of speech.37
In the language of First Amendment scholarship, we often treat First
Amendment protection as involving two steps. First, we analyze whether a
particular act is “covered” by the First Amendment—whether it is salient to the
First Amendment because it is recognizable as expressive or entwined with

32

Bambauer, supra note 2, at 61; Campbell, supra note 31, at 50-51.
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 819-20.
34 Id. at 810-21.
35 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001).
36 E.g., Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1035.
37 This Article offers the “careful examination of relevant . . . regulatory interests” called
for by Bhagwat in an intermediate scrutiny context. Bhagwat, supra note 33, at 826.
33
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expression.38 Second, we ask what kind of scrutiny applies to determine
whether the expressive act is protected and the regulation fails.39
The right to record suggests several things. First, it suggests that
assessments of the type of harm at issue are implicit in both coverage and
scrutiny analyses. In other words, despite the Supreme Court’s recent
disavowals of harm assessments and balancing, the scope of a speech right is at
least partially defined by a court’s conception of its related harms. Second, the
right to record suggests that there are physical places where speech disappears:
what is expressive in one location may not be expressive for First Amendment
purposes in other locations.40 Thus, taking the approach that recording is
universally “covered” by the First Amendment, without seriously assessing
scrutiny, ignores that the right functionally does not exist in some places.
Understanding the right to record contributes to discussions of “invisible
speech”—clearly expressive activities, like agreeing to a contract, or joining a
conspiracy, or committing a securities violation, that are not visible to the First
Amendment at all.41
Privacy may end up breaking, or at least bending, the First Amendment,
requiring recalibration of the current ossified categorical approach in other
areas. We may need to assess, for example, whether courts should generally in
the privacy context break with traditions of content neutrality to take into
account whether information is about a private matter or a matter of public
concern, as suggested by the Court in Bartnicki and other cases. We may need
to consider whether First Amendment doctrine, currently suspicious of
regulation of distribution, should be altered to allow an exception for revenge
pornography, or some form of a “right to be forgotten,” or other forms of data
privacy governance that target information sharing.42
But with respect to the recording right, the contribution of this Article is that
the doctrine is already nuanced enough to accommodate a privacy-speech
interface of a particular kind. Buried in existing First Amendment doctrine is a
nuanced understanding of exactly the kind of privacy protected by laws
governing private actors and their ability to record.

38

Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1766-68 (2004).
39 See id. at 1769-71 (discussing the difference between First Amendment protection and
coverage).
40 See id. at 1768 (listing several categories of speech, including speech governed by the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Uniform Commercial Code, where the line between First
Amendment coverage and noncoverage is “invisible”).
41 Schauer, supra note 38, at 1768.
42 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 348-49 (2014); Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View
from the Front Lines, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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RECORDING AS SPEECH

Recording should be protected under the First Amendment. Doctrine,
theory, and practical considerations all support protecting a right to record.
None of these explain, however, exactly how or to what extent recording
should be protected, or how it should be balanced against privacy interests.43
In this Part, I discuss how recording has been treated with respect to First
Amendment salience. I then join a growing chorus of voices that advocates for
a right to record. I compare different ways in which the recording right might
be salient to the First Amendment: as speech, as an access or newsgathering
right, or as speech entwined with action.
In practice, courts have largely chosen to protect the right to record as some
combination of an access right and speech entwined with action. This leads to
the question addressed in Part III: How can we arrive at a principled
understanding of why recording is treated by the First Amendment as situated
in physical space? The answer lies in understanding the privacy harms that
recording can trigger.
A.

Recording as Nonspeech

Regulating recording was not treated as a First Amendment issue until
relatively recently. Recording, in other words, has not always been salient as
expression, and courts continue to divide on whether it receives First
Amendment protection at all.
Some courts in right-to-record cases have asked whether recording is speech
or conduct. The First Amendment test for distinguishing speech from conduct,
articulated in Spence v. Washington,44 asks whether somebody intends to
communicate a particularized message that is likely to be understood.45
According to several courts applying the Spence test to recording, if there is no
demonstrable intent to communicate a particularized message to an audience,
recording is not speech.46 Some courts thus recognize First Amendment
protection for recording only if a person can show an intent to distribute a
recording; they otherwise characterize the moment of recording as governable
action rather than speech.47 A district court recently explained that the First
43

Bambauer, supra note 2, at 109 (arguing for recognition of the right to record, but not
establishing the appropriate level of scrutiny, explaining that “the contours of First
Amendment scrutiny are complex and deserve careful consideration”).
44 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
45 Id. at 410-11; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
46 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 76 (citing cases that reason this way); Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1486 (2013) (suggesting that
while an actual audience is not necessary, an anticipated audience is). But see Kreimer,
supra note 2, at 377 (“It is simply not the case, moreover, that an external audience is or
should be a necessary condition of First Amendment protection.”).
47 See Baumbauer, supra note 2, at 76-77 (citing cases that require an intent to
communicate for photography to be deemed speech); Benjamin, supra note 46, at 1479
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Amendment would protect recording only if it was accompanied by a verbal
announcement (or other expressive conduct) explicitly indicating disagreement
with police activity.48 As discussed below, against the backdrop of both First
Amendment theory and protection for newsgathering and penumbral rights,
this reasoning is significantly flawed.
Another way to approach recording is by looking at the type of law at issue
rather than the nature of the governed act. The First Amendment does not
protect newsgatherers from laws of general applicability.49 A newspaper and
its reporters may be subject to general tax laws, to antitrust laws, and even to
requirements that reporters, like all citizens, respond to a grand jury
subpoena.50 A law can, however, move out of the category of a law of general
applicability if it impermissibly targets a particular speaker or subject matter.51
Privacy laws governing recording have historically been characterized as
laws of general applicability, not as laws targeted at speech or particular
speakers. Most wiretap laws, eavesdropping laws, and other privacy laws tend
to be subject-matter—or at least viewpoint—neutral, and thus were, until
recently, invisible to the First Amendment. For example, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in 1971 compared eavesdropping laws to trespass and
theft laws, which are considered generally applicable forms of governance not

(explaining that algorithmic speech should be protected under the First Amendment only
when a human is “sending a substantive message in such a way that others can receive it”);
see also Fields v. City of Phila., 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
48 Fields, 166 F. Supp. 3d at 535. I led a recent amicus effort urging the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit to overturn this decision. Law Professors Amicus in Fields (Right to
Record) MARGOTKAMINSKI.COM (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.margotkaminski.com/?p=73
[https://perma.cc/6WA9-GF94].
49 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) (“[G]enerally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”).
50 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (holding that subpoenaing the press
does not violate the First Amendment); Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131,
139-40 (1969) (applying First Amendment doctrine concerning newsgathering to antitrust
laws); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 6-7, 19-20 (1945) (same); Associated
Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 130-33 (1937) (holding an NLRB order under the National
Labor Relations Act applicable to the Associated Press constitutional under the First
Amendment).
51 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581
(1983) (finding a tax targeting a newspaper to be unconstitutional, but noting “[i]t is beyond
dispute that the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally
applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems”); Grosjean v.
Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (same); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564
U.S. 552, 565 (2011) (finding that content-based regulation will receive strict scrutiny when
it is aimed at a particular speaker); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381, 391-92
(1992) (finding that the government cannot target a particular speaker or viewpoint within a
category of speech that is otherwise unprotected).
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subject to First Amendment scrutiny.52 Other courts have similarly treated
privacy laws as laws of general applicability.53 The Supreme Court appeared to
condone this approach in Bartnicki.54 According to these courts, laws targeting
the distribution of recordings target speech, but laws governing recording do
not.
Even before current right-to-record case law, this approach of treating
recording laws as laws of general applicability began to break down. In 1995,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that while journalists were
not immune from liability for breaking generally applicable laws such as
trespass, privacy laws were distinct from trespass law.55 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit revisited the issue in 1997, when it assessed privacy laws with greater
deference to newsgatherers, suggesting that the privacy laws were no longer
inscrutable laws of general applicability.56
The fact that recording laws are now at least partially visible to First
Amendment analysis suggests that they are moving out of the box of laws that
includes trespass and into the box that includes laws that target speech.57
Scholars advocating for a right to record push for precisely this shift: to
treating privacy laws that constrain recording as speech-targeting laws, not
laws of general applicability.58
B.

Protecting the Right to Record: First Amendment Theory

Bartnicki appears to set up a workable framework for privacy regulation:
target recording, not distribution. On closer scrutiny, however, its suggestion

52

Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (“The First Amendment is
not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means . . . .”).
53 See, e.g., Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(analyzing privacy implications when a news team entered someone’s bedroom without
authorization to film a rescue attempt by paramedics); Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 109
Cal. Rptr. 269, 272-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that plaintiff had a cause of action
against a private investigator who obtained entrance into a hospital room by deception);
Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting First
Amendment newsgathering defense regarding the violation of eavesdropping statutes), rev’d
on other grounds, 601 N.W.2d 108 (Mich. 1999).
54 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526-31 (2001).
55 Desnick v. Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that
“there is no journalists’ privilege to trespass,” but noting that the reporters “entered offices
that were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services and videotaped
physicians engaged in professional, not personal, communications with strangers (the testers
themselves)”).
56 Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Cos., 121 F.3d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1997).
57 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 602 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The Illinois
eavesdropping statute may or may not be a law of general applicability . . . .”).
58 E.g., Bambauer, supra note 2, at 111; Campbell, supra note 31, at 50-51; Kreimer,
supra note 2, at 392.
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that recording should be a First Amendment-free zone does not hold up.59 I
join a number of scholars in arguing that theory, intuition, and doctrine all
suggest that the right to record should be afforded at least some form of First
Amendment protection.60
First Amendment protection is justified under three dominant theories: (1)
protection for the marketplace of ideas; (2) protection of speech necessary for
democratic self-governance; and (3) protection of the individual autonomy
interest in speech.61 Under the theory of the marketplace of ideas, we protect
speech so that a listener or reader can shop amongst competing ideas in a
search for “truth.” Under the theory of democratic self-governance, we protect
speech to better enable citizens to participate in the process of governance.
Under the autonomy theory, we protect an individual’s autonomy, allowing the
government to regulate her speech only when a significant, nonspeech-related
harm can be shown.
Under any of these theories, some version of the right to record should be
protected.62 Audiovisual recordings often contribute to the marketplace of
ideas and are now a regular part of the vast array of media consumed by most
individuals in their searches for “truth.” Even other kinds of recording, such as
gathering data to build maps of the physical environment,63 or recording the
59

Here I agree with Jane Bambauer, who pushes back on the Bartnicki framework and
calls for a First Amendment “right to create knowledge” as a necessary precursor to speech.
Bambauer, supra note 2, at 61 (observing of Bartnicki that “[i]f the dissemination of
mechanical recordings receives First Amendment protection (which it does), then the
creation of those same recordings must have First Amendment significance, too” (footnotes
omitted)).
60 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 2, at 61; Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 999.
61 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 478
(2011); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 75 (1948) (noting the importance of the value of democratic self-governance
by concluding that “we of the United States have decided to be a self-governing
community”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 141 (1859) (emphasizing the importance of
autonomy interests by noting that the “acts of an individual may be hurtful to others . . .
without going to the length of violating any of their constituted rights”); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
62 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 91-104; Blitz, supra note 2, at 174 (“[I]f and when the
First Amendment protects such activity, it should do so with a right to receive information
and ideas that protects the pursuit of these individual interests. Such an emphasis is not only
necessary to advance central First Amendment purposes, but compatible both with limits on
the scope of the right, and with the goal of leaving room for privacy rights that entail
denying individuals some of the information they might seek.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at
379 (“The government is barred from intermeddling in both speech and thought because
both undergird the constitutional commitments to personal autonomy and popular
sovereignty.”); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 999 (“First Amendment theory strongly
supports the notion that video recording is a form of expression or conduct preparatory to
speech.”).
63 Blitz, supra note 2, at 124-26.
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heat emanations from apartments to determine whether they are occupied by
more than the permitted number of tenants,64 contribute more information to
the marketplace of ideas.
Under the theory of democratic self-governance, we should at least protect
the right of citizens to record government officials or acts of governance, in
order to better enable individuals to participate in the political process.65 This
theory suggests, for example, that recording police activity should be squarely
protected by the First Amendment, both because the recording serves a
government oversight function and because it can inform future policy
choices.66 A broader view of democratic self-governance suggests protecting
not just political audiovisual recordings, but anything that properly belongs in
the public sphere, where it can contribute to an individual’s understanding of
herself as a citizen. Similarly, a broader view of democratic self-governance
suggests that the First Amendment should protect anything that, when
regulated, threatens an individual’s view of the legitimacy of her
government.67 If government regulation of, say, cellular phone recording
threatens an individual’s sense of the legitimacy of her government, it should
be protected.
Both the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance theories
suggest a hierarchy of protected recordings, however. We might, for example,
under self-governance theory, protect only recordings of public figures or
matters of public concern68 and afford less protection to other kinds of subject
matter. Under the marketplace of ideas, we may be less concerned with
frivolous recordings or seemingly personal recordings because their
contribution to a search for “truth” may be characterized as less significant.
Under autonomy theory, however, these hierarchies disintegrate. One can
argue under autonomy theory that all forms of recording should be protected
unless the government can show a significant nonspeech-related harm.69 Those
64

A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning
from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1724.
65 See Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1065 (noting that the Supreme Court has ruled in
multiple cases that First Amendment protections are extended to speech “about a matter of
public concern”); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 999-1004 (explaining how the advent
of modern video recording technology and distribution has better enabled individuals to
participate in democracy); Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 154 (discussing the value of image
capture for providing greater transparency in the job performance of public officials).
66 See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record
the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1560 (2016) [hereinafter Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras];
Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 413 [hereinafter Simonson,
Copwatching] (2016).
67 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2369 (2000).
68 Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1065; Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 155-56.
69 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 100; Blitz, supra note 2, at 174 (discussing the broad
protection the First Amendment should provide to an individual’s right to receive
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who agree with the autonomy theory of the First Amendment will find it
hardest to stomach a right to record that is limited solely to matters of public
concern.
There is evidence in current doctrine that courts find the autonomy theory
significant. Speech protections generally run broader than just protecting “high
value” speech, and there are significant practical problems—resulting in both
overinclusion and underinclusion—with asking courts to assess when speech is
“high value,” or a matter of public concern.70 Moreover, the current Supreme
Court appears largely to embrace a broader First Amendment, affording
protection to clearly lower-value speech—such as lies or violent video
games—not just speech valuable to self-governance or a high-minded search
for “truth.”71
Yet, it is possible to embrace the autonomy theory of the First Amendment
while also recognizing significant autonomy interests in privacy protection.72
The right-to-record puzzle is most interesting and difficult under this theory
that encourages the broadest form of First Amendment protection. How should
we protect individual autonomy with the right to record while also protecting
individual autonomy from ubiquitous or mass surveillance?73
First Amendment theory, therefore, suggests that at least some recording
should be protected by the First Amendment.74 It does not, however, dictate (1)
what kinds of recordings should be covered by the First Amendment; (2) what
form of scrutiny laws governing recording should face; or (3) how to reconcile
competing interests, such as privacy, with an expansive right to record.75
C. A Note on Automation
One potential way to limit the scope of the right to record, which might at
least cabin the number of recordings falling under First Amendment protection,
would be to recognize a right to record only when there is a human author.76 A

information and ideas when pursuing their individual interests).
70 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 117 (finding that there is no clear guidance for courts
to determine which types of speech are important enough to be protected); Blitz, supra note
2, at 169.
71 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012); United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
72 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 101; Blitz, supra note 2, at 190 (acknowledging that there
are legitimate concerns about protecting individual privacy when permitting the right to
record and capture images in public and private places).
73 Blitz, supra note 2, at 192.
74 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 105.
75 Id.; Blitz, supra note 2, at 192-93 (stating that government restrictions on information
gathering must overcome the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny test, without analyzing how
such a balancing test would apply).
76 Cf. Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 100 (suggesting limiting the right to record from drone
surveillance to journalist authors).
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large number of recordings are made by cameras or other sensors placed in
physical locations, with no human being present to turn the cameras on and off.
And a large amount of future recordings will likely be made by automatic or
autonomous systems such as drones or driverless cars, which will use such
recordings for navigation and other more nefarious purposes, like assessing
insurance risk.77 One could limit the scope of the conflict between privacy and
the right to record by eliminating these types of recordings from First
Amendment coverage.78
First, this will be hard to do in practice. While determining the nature of
algorithmic authorship is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting
that it can be incredibly challenging to draw the line between human and
algorithmic authorship.79 Second, it is not clear from current case law that such
a distinction would be viable. Courts assessing recording have not
distinguished between cameras held by humans and cameras left in place by an
absent human author.80
The bigger issue with trying to line-draw around algorithmic authorship,
however, is that the social meaning of a particular recording will likely be the
same regardless of whether it is made by a human or an algorithm.81 One
person’s security tape is another person’s news story.82 It does not matter, from
a viewer’s perspective, whether the tape is “authored” by a stationary,
nonhuman security camera, or a lauded film director.83

77 See The First 1000 Commercial UAS Exemptions, ASS’N FOR UNMANNED AERIAL
VEHICLE SYS. INT’L, www.auvsi.org/1000report [https://perma.cc/33TL-9F8Y] (last visited
Oct. 18, 2016).
78 See Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 132-34 (distinguishing between human photography
and automated image capture and suggesting that the former might receive greater First
Amendment protection).
79 See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 46, at 1493 n.143; Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 1495, 1504 (2013); see also Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free
Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1187 (2016). But see
James Grimmelmann, There’s No Such Thing as a Computer-Authored Work—And It’s a
Good Thing, Too, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 403, 408 (2016) (arguing that human and
algorithmic authorship are the same).
80 See, e.g., S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir.
2007), mentioned in Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1028-29.
81 See, e.g., Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 720 (2000); Andrew Tutt, Software Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 73, 77 (2012).
82 See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 347 (“As image-capture capability has diffused, publicly
salient images emerge not only from premeditated efforts to prepare for public dialogue, but
from recordings by serendipitous amateur photographers.”); see also Bambauer, supra note
2, at 85 (“Though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question whether
mechanical recordings are protected speech, it has recognized that information gathering is a
necessity for speech.”).
83 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 59-60 (“A distinction can be made between statements
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This is because the First Amendment protects the rights of listeners in
addition to the rights of speakers.84 If we recognize that an algorithmically
“authored” recording can nonetheless impact viewers and listeners as much as
a human-authored recording, then all three First Amendment theories—the
marketplace of ideas, democratic self-governance, and even autonomy—
suggest extending some form of First Amendment protection to the
recording.85
D.

Free Speech Intuitions and the Right to Record

Cultural intuitions about free speech protection similarly suggest that
recording should be protected by the First Amendment. Take the following
examples.
The cases that have given rise to the recognition of the right to record
largely involve the arrest of citizens who recorded police actions in public
places.86 If there is no First Amendment protection at all for recording, then a
person who pulls out a smartphone to record police malfeasance could be
arrested without judicial scrutiny of the impact on free expression. This would
also leave legislatures unchecked when enacting laws banning recording. That
seems wrong.
A second common fact pattern might trigger more complicated intuitions. A
number of states have enacted “ag-gag” laws largely aimed at public interest
groups intent on filming abusive behavior on factory farms.87 On the one hand,
the banned recording in the ag-gag context takes place on private land, without
the permission of a private landowner. On the other, the laws target
newsworthy information and often target particular viewpoints of individuals
who want to speak out against factory farms. If recording is invisible to the
First Amendment, then these laws would not undergo judicial scrutiny of their
impact on free speech, leaving legislatures unchecked.
Discussion of drones may spark similarly mixed intuitions. On the one hand,
states have enacted privacy laws governing the use of drones to record private

of fact that are observed and written by a human and those that are collected mechanically,
and it might be tempting to draw the First Amendment line between the two. But the
distinction is untenable.”).
84 See Massaro & Norton, supra note 79, at 1175-78 (emphasizing listener rights as the
source of protection for artificial intelligence authorship or speech). But cf. Benjamin, supra
note 46, at 1477 (stating that the rights of listeners and viewers are “articulated as []
addition[s] to the rights of speakers, as opposed to [] substitute[s] for them”).
85 See Benjamin, supra note 46, at 1477-78.
86 See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 600 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe,
655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir.
2000).
87 Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 994-96 (discussing the enactment of legislation in
various states that “criminalizes the act of nonconsensual audio or video recording on the
premises of slaughterhouses, factory farms, and other industrial meat operations”).
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individuals in their own backyards, largely protecting an understandable
privacy interest.88 On the other, when the Federal Aviation Administration
(“FAA”) proclaimed the area immediately above Ferguson, Missouri to be a
no-fly zone in the wake of public protests, the ban clearly had First
Amendment implications.89 The restriction on flight above Ferguson prevented
recording and media reporting of what was happening on the ground. That
flight ban may have turned out to be justified for safety reasons, but if there is
no protection for a right to record, then the FAA’s actions would receive no
First Amendment analysis to determine if an impermissible motive existed for
regulating speech.
E.

First Amendment Doctrine and the Right to Record

A right to record fits not only within free speech intuitions and First
Amendment theory but also within several lines of well-established doctrine.
Recording might be protected as speech itself, or it might be protected because
it is a necessary part of a recognized communications medium. The First
Amendment also protects the corollary or penumbral rights that are necessary
for speech; newsgathering is a particular kind of corollary right. Again, as with
First Amendment theory, these doctrines lead to potentially different levels of
both coverage and scrutiny. The doctrines vary in both the scope and strength
of potential protection for a right to record.
Several scholars have suggested that recording video might be fully
protected expression. They argue that just as writing words or editing a film is
clearly expressive, recording that film must be expressive, too.90 After all, the
First Amendment protects movies as speech,91 without asking whether a
“particularized message” has been expressed.92 The First Amendment protects

88 See, e.g., infra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing various states’ drone
regulations).
89 See Margot E. Kaminski, Up in the Air: The Free-Speech Problems Raised by
(Nov.
25
2014,
11:56
AM),
Regulating
Drones,
SLATE
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/faa_s_attempts_to_regulate_
drones_could_have_first_amendment_problems.html [https://perma.cc/X8FZ-669A]; see
also Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Issues Temporary Flight Restriction over
Ferguson,
Missouri,
(Nov.
25,
2014),
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=17854&cid=TW283
[https://perma.cc/P6WL-E88W].
90 See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 343; Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1015 (“[A]ll
speech is conduct—whether it involves writing words on a page, carrying a picket sign, [or]
shouting a protest chant . . . .”).
91 See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (finding that both “pictures
[and] films . . . have First Amendment protection”); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 495 (1952) (protecting films regardless of commercial motive).
92 Kreimer, supra note 2, at 373 (“[T]he Court has treated images as media of
communication without inquiring into an illusively specific message.”).
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not just the public exhibition of video but also private viewings.93 If the First
Amendment protects the distribution and viewing of video, it seems strange to
say it affords no protection to video recording.94 Additionally, audiovisual
recording may be fully protected as speech in connection to freedom of
thought; making a video for later recollection might be analogous to keeping a
private diary for later personal consumption.95
Even if recording is not equivalent to pure speech, there is clear doctrinal
protection for conduct essential to recognized communications media.96
Audiovisual recording may be protected as conduct integral to expression,
even if recording itself is not considered to be equivalent to oral speech or
writing. Once society recognizes a particular communications medium, First
Amendment protection extends beyond the finished communications product
into the production process.97 When the state targets an integral aspect of a
recognized communications medium, such as by placing a tax on pen and
paper, that action may be suspect under the First Amendment.98 The Supreme
Court recognized in 1952 that “motion pictures are a significant medium for
the communication of ideas.”99 Like buying pen and paper, video recording
93

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man . . . what books he may read or
what films he may watch.”).
94 Bambauer, supra note 2, at 61.
95 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The right to think is the
beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is
the beginning of thought.”); Blitz, supra note 2, at 148 (“Taking a picture is in many
respects analogous to drawing or painting what one sees. It represents and fixes a visual
experience in a particular medium of expression, usually to remember it later or to share it
with others.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 342 (commenting that “camera-phone users
ubiquitously capture and archive images to record their experiences for future reference”);
id. at 378 (recognizing that “[a] diary entry begins a process of communicating with an
audience of one: my entries are subject to review by my future self”).
96 Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1018.
97 See ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2012) (“This observation
holds true when the expressive medium is mechanical rather than manual.”); Anderson v.
City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The process of expression
through a medium has never been thought so distinct from the expression itself that we
could disaggregate Picasso from his brushes and canvas, or that we could value Beethoven
without the benefit of strings and woodwinds.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 382 (“Almost all
media of expression can be broken down into a series of social practices and preconditions
that are not themselves expressive.”); Post, supra note 81, at 717 (“If the state were to
prohibit the use of [film] projectors without a license, First Amendment coverage would
undoubtedly be triggered. This is not because projectors constitute speech acts, but because
they are integral to the forms of interaction that comprise the genre of the cinema.”).
98 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93
(1983) (invalidating a tax on ink and paper used in producing newspapers).
99 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (emphasis added); see also
Blitz, supra note 2, at 139 (“[T]elling stories with photographically captured light has
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may be protected because it is conduct that is essentially preparatory to speech
via a recognized communications medium.100
This analysis of recording as pure speech or as conduct integral to a
communications medium leaves open several questions. First, there is the
question of whether one must always have an audience in mind or an intent to
distribute the final communications product.101 In order for recording to
constitute speech, must it be directed to another person? Some scholars have
argued that it must.102 Others disagree.103 Cases suggest, however, that speech
need not be published to be protected, pointing to the idea that a distribution
requirement is not necessary.104
Second, while these analyses may work for audiovisual film, which the
Supreme Court has recognized as protected expression and a protected
medium,105 it is unclear whether they might apply to other kinds of recording.
This presents a line-drawing problem: Is there some way to distinguish
between audiovisual recording and, say, observing and recording thermal
imagery?106 If such distinctions exist, are they principled? Are they workable
in light of rapid technological change? It can be challenging to determine when
a particular practice constitutes a recognizable communications medium. This

become, as Kreimer and other scholars observe, a familiar mode of expressing
oneself . . . .”); Campbell, supra note 31, at 50 (“Cameras and other audiovisual recording
devices are conventional means of communication—that is, they are conventionally used for
communicative purposes.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 339 (“In today’s world, personal
image capture is part of a medium of expression entitled to First Amendment cognizance.”).
100 See Campbell, supra note 31, at 50-51 (“Targeted regulations of audiovisual
recording thus single out conduct commonly associated with expression and impose an
apparent disproportionate burden on speech.”); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1018.
101 See, e.g., Fields v. City of Phila., 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (finding
that expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment exists where there is an “intent to
convey a particularized message”).
102 See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 46, at 1483; Barry P. McDonald, The First
Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather
Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 257 (2004).
103 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 2, at 59; Kreimer, supra note 2, at 377.
104 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (explaining
that the First Amendment protects “a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which
serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect” (quoting Estate
of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968))). But see Benjamin,
supra note 46, at 1484 (arguing that meaning has to be communicated to be considered
protected speech).
105 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[W]e conclude that
expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press
guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
106 Campbell, supra note 31, at 52 (suggesting we distinguish between audiovisual
recording, which should be protected as part of a communications medium, and other kinds
of recording, which should not be protected).
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could result in too little protection, by failing to capture newer technologies, or
it might not limit protection at all. For example, one could argue that Google
Maps is now a widespread communications medium, and thus all gathering of
geolocation data should be protected speech.
Third, and most significantly, the act of recording differs from opening
one’s mouth to speak, or even from burning a flag, because both expressive
moments are created at the same time they are disseminated.107 By contrast,
books are printed before they are distributed; photographs are taken before
they are displayed; and movies are filmed before they are screened.108 When
you can demarcate the act of producing communication from the act of
actually communicating, this raises the questions of whether the act of
production is truly part of the communicative moment and how far into
conduct First Amendment protections extend.109 As one scholar has noted,
protecting the production of speech implicates issues from regulating tattoo
parlors to regulating the production of pornography.110
Protecting recording as speech thus raises a broader line-drawing problem:
many forms of conduct can be understood as significantly entwined with
speech. What is to distinguish recording from other kinds of conduct?
Traveling to a foreign country, for example, could be cast as necessary for
informed speech about that country.111 The Supreme Court has rejected First
Amendment protection for such travel, noting that: “There are few restrictions
on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of
decreased data flow. . . . The right to speak and publish does not carry with it
the unrestrained right to gather information.”112
Characterizing the governance of audiovisual recording as equivalent to the
governance of speech or governance of a communications medium fails to
helpfully distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable regulatory interests.
If aiming a regulation at audiovisual recording always constitutes improper
targeting of speech, then there appears to be no room for acceptable
nonspeech-related government motives.
The final doctrinal justification for protecting a right to record is, in my
view, the most convincing. The First Amendment protects not just core rights

107

Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1033 (explaining that oral speech and in-person conduct are
created and disseminated simultaneously).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1033-34. Seth Kreimer has noted that this distinction is sometimes meaningless
in today’s communications environment because in practice images are often captured and
immediately disseminated, such as with live video broadcasting. Kreimer, supra note 2, at
376.
110 Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1034.
111 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (“Appellant also asserts that the Secretary [of
State’s] refusal to validate his passport for travel to Cuba denies him rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment.”).
112 Id. at 16-17.
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but also the penumbral and corollary rights that are necessary for core
protections.113 The Supreme Court has explained that “[w]ithout those
peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.”114 The First
Amendment protects not only speech, but also “the indispensable conditions of
meaningful communication.”115 The First Amendment thus provides corollary
protections beyond the core protection of speech, including the right to
distribute, the right to receive, the right to read, freedom of inquiry, freedom of
thought, and freedom of expressive association.116 The Court has extended
penumbral or corollary First Amendment protections not just to the act of
printing a newspaper, but to various links in the distribution chain, including
the distribution of handbills,117 acts of door-to-door solicitation,118 the
operation of sound amplification equipment,119 and the placement of
newspaper racks.120
113 The existence of such corollary rights is “necessary in making the express guarantees
[of the First Amendment] fully meaningful.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483
(1965); see also Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1097-98 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“Constitutional rights thus implicitly protect those closely related acts
necessary to their exercise . . . . [T]he First Amendment ‘right to speak would be largely
ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial transactions that are the
incidents of its exercise.’” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 252 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part))).
114 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83.
115 Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587-88 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (proposing a “structural role” for the First Amendment in providing access to
court).
116 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
117 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 16869 (2002) (invalidating an ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (stating that pamphlets and leaflets are protected
because the liberty of the press “comprehends every sort of publication which affords a
vehicle of information and opinion”).
118 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 753 (1988).
119 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 793 (1989) (finding that a city
ordinance that regulated the sound equipment used at a public bandshell was valid but
required First Amendment analysis).
120 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 410 (1993). Several
scholars have argued that the Press Clause supports these kinds of structural First
Amendment protections. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV.
309, 318 (2008); McDonald, supra note 102, at 343 (proposing an expanded interpretation
of the Press Clause that would “protect information-gathering conduct necessary for
preserving valuable information flows to the public”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the
Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 459, 463 (2012).
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The First Amendment protects such corollary rights so that the government
cannot prevent speech by targeting conduct that falls just outside, but is still
necessary for, expression. Information gathering, and similarly information
recording, is often necessary for speech to occur.121 As the Seventh Circuit
observed:
The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily
included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press
rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording.
The right to publish or broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would
be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the
recording is wholly unprotected . . . .122
Newsgathering, which I discuss at greater length below, is one such
protected corollary right. And the newsgathering case law—while not perfectly
mapping on to the right to record—gives significant hints as to how to
recognize and draw principled lines around the burgeoning right to record.
F.

Recording as Speech?

Is recording protectable as speech? This is, in my view, the wrong way to
frame the question. If we ask the question, “Is recording speech?” then we are
faced with limited options for making room for other values—and we fail to
accurately capture the relationship between the recording right and physical
spaces. If recording is speech like the Internet is speech or like movies are
speech, then regulation of recording will likely be subjected to strict scrutiny,
unless the regulation addresses one of a limited list of historical exemptions to
speech protection.123 Privacy is not one of these historical exemptions, and
thus—absent significant adjustment to strict scrutiny, or the creation of an
explicit privacy exemption or balancing test—privacy laws regulating
recording would almost always fail strict scrutiny and be held unconstitutional.
This result does not comport with the Supreme Court’s suggested approach
in Bartnicki, nor does it comport with the intuition that, in some cases, speech

121

See Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1058 (“[T]he Court has long interpreted the Speech
Clause to extend penumbral protection to conduct closely associated with speech, notably
distribution of speech but also some speech-preceding conduct. Furthermore, there seems no
reason not to read the Press Clause to also provide some penumbral protections.”); see also
Bambauer, supra note 2, at 70 (“One might assume that the creation of data tends to receive
protection as well, since the collection of data is a necessary precursor to having and sharing
it.”); Blitz, supra note 2, at 154-55 (“It is hard to see how such peripheral rights could fail to
include the right to have access to the media and tools that make speech possible.”).
122 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Bambauer, supra
note 2, at 73 (“Indirect burdens on speech provoke First Amendment scrutiny . . . when the
intended target of the regulation is so closely linked to speech, so indispensible to First
Amendment rights, that it is an impediment to speech itself.”).
123 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539-40 (2012); United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
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and privacy should be balanced against each other and privacy might win.
Strict scrutiny requires a categorical rather than a balancing approach to First
Amendment protection and is particularly ill-suited to contextual analysis. The
right to record is nothing if not contextual.
But when we look to corollary rights, also referred to as structural First
Amendment rights, the picture becomes clearer. When scholars characterize
the right to record as a “necessary precursor to speech,” they characterize the
right as a structural right, rather than equivalent to oral speech.124 Courts
recognize that structural rights are more contextual and more entwined with
other regulatory interests, such as an interest in raising revenue through general
taxation, or in keeping a clear flow of traffic, or preserving quiet in a
residential neighborhood.
Treating the right to record as a structural right still leaves significant
doctrinal puzzles in place. For example, it still does not explain how to
disentangle government interests in protecting privacy from impermissible
interests in preventing recording. And while some instantiations of structural
rights appear to be disembodied from their physical locations (e.g., a tax on
newspapers), others are analyzed in their physical contexts (e.g., the placement
of newsracks). Characterizing the right to record as a structural right still does
not yield a clear answer about whether or how the right should be situated in
physical space.
Analyzing recording requires analyzing context. That context often includes
the nature of a physical space. Does an invitation to come into your home give
the invitee a First Amendment right to record there and subject any privacy
regulation governing recording in the home to strict scrutiny? What if you
purchase a smart refrigerator, a toy, or a robot—does the company that sells
the object now have a First Amendment right to record all activities in your
home?125 Governing recording cannot possibly always trigger strict scrutiny or
always fail intermediate scrutiny. The next Section explains why.
G.

Recording as Access

The act of recording takes place in a physical environment. It is thus illsuited to being treated like an abstract category of media.126 Recording, in
other words, is not a communications medium like movies, broadcasting, video
games, or the Internet, to be evaluated in the abstract. Thus, in my view, it is
incorrect to treat recording as a traditional abstract First Amendment “coverage
problem,” involving the extension of speech protection to a new type of
media.127 Answers to the more difficult questions about the right to record
124

See Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1019, 1047.
For discussion of this question, see Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What
Will We Have Agreed To?, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 661 (2015).
126 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 847 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 112.
127 Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 998 (referring to the question of “is X speech?” as
125
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come from the understanding that recording takes place in a particular context,
grounded in physical space and time.
Courts have discussed the importance of grounding the recording right in a
physical space, though they have not yet sorted out the implications of this
analysis.128 Courts have cabined their approaches to the right to record to
recognizing protection for recordings on matters of public concern, performed
in traditionally public spaces.129 The currently limited nature of the recording
right—limited to public locations and to matters of public concern—makes
sense only if one understands the right as the progeny of corollary rights
doctrine, specifically access and newsgathering doctrine. Access and
newsgathering doctrine historically involves inquiry into both the type of
material at issue and the nature of the space in which newsgathering occurs.
Access case law addresses whether newsgatherers have a right to enter a
particular space for purposes of gathering information.130 It is both more
nuanced and less speech protective than the First Amendment’s treatment of
communications media in the abstract.131 To establish whether an access right
exists, courts perform a balancing test of sorts, discussed further below, which
takes into consideration the nature of the location. Once an access right exists,
courts apply something resembling a relaxed version of strict scrutiny; courts
have upheld access restrictions more frequently than restrictions on pure
speech.132
This nuance is understandable. On the one hand, information gathering
involves physical conduct in a physical space; entering a location and
interacting with others once one is in that location. On the other hand,
information gathering appears integral to the speech-creating process. This
presents a difficult puzzle for courts.133 That puzzle becomes all the more

the “so-called coverage problem”).
128 See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (not deciding on
the time, place, and manner standard, but performing analysis under it nonetheless); Glik v.
Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (observing that the right to record “may be subject
to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions”).
129 Glik, 655 F.3d at 82.
130 See generally McDonald, supra note 102, at 251-52.
131 See id. at 273 (“[I]t is evident that a right to gather information lies at the periphery of
traditional First Amendment protection for expressive activities . . . .”).
132 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986) (“[T]he presumption may
be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to
preserve higher values, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be
articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine
whether the closure order was properly entered.”).
133 See McDonald, supra note 102, at 256 (“On the one hand, information gathering
frequently consists of non-expressive conduct that bears a more attenuated link to acts of
expression than other forms of non-expressive conduct . . . . On the other hand, the
government could abridge flows of important information to the public by simply restricting
or burdening antecedent conduct that generates those flows.” (emphasis omitted)).

2017]

PRIVACY AND THE RIGHT TO RECORD

193

difficult because of the Supreme Court’s (in my view, correct) reluctance to
privilege institutional media over citizen speakers.134 If one newsgatherer is
allowed access, then all must be.135 This makes courts reluctant to open a door,
because if it is open to one, it will be open to all.136
Access case law largely addresses access to particular physical or
sociophysical spaces. In 1974, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment
right to access prison inmates for interviews.137 In 1980 and again in 1982,
however, the Court held that the First Amendment requires a public right of
access to criminal trials.138 Newsgatherers and the public may access particular
government proceedings if (1) those proceedings have been historically open
to the public, and (2) the public access ensures the functioning of a government
process.139 These elements are referred to as the “logic and experience”
principles of access case law, derived from Justice Brennan’s concurrence in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.140
A different line of newsgathering cases—more directly related to the right to
record—addresses whether a person has a right to use a particular technology
once she has been granted legal access to a space.141 In 1965, the Court in

134 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (citing Austin v. Mich. State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (finding the Court
has “consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional
privilege beyond that of other speakers”).
135 Id. at 353.
136 But see McDonald, supra note 102, at 257 (proposing that courts use the Press Clause
to provide special protection not for institutional media, but for those fulfilling a
newsgathering and edifying role); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1025, 1030 (2011) (arguing “[f]or the Press Clause to mean something independent of
the Speech Clause, it necessarily cannot apply to everyone” and that by limiting the “press
club” the courts can bestow certain investigative immunities upon newsgatherers through
the Press Clause).
137 Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (upholding a federal prison policy
prohibiting face-to-face interviews with inmates at maximum security prisons); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974) (holding newsgatherers “have no constitutional
right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded to the general public” and
upholding a California prison regulation prohibiting face-to-face interviews with inmates).
138 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 585 (1980) (plurality opinion). In
subsequent cases, and using similar reasoning, the Supreme Court has recognized the right
of access to cover juror voir dire proceedings and probable cause hearings. Press-Enter. Co.
v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 10, 12 (1986); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S.
501, 508 (1984). Lower courts have applied the “experience and logic” principles to
determine the existence of public access rights in other areas. McDonald, supra note 102, at
303-04.
139 Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605-06.
140 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
141 McDonald, supra note 102, at 276 n.80.
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Estes v. Texas142 evaluated whether a television reporter had a First
Amendment right not just to access but to televise a criminal trial.143 The Court
said no. It explained that it “is a misconception of the rights of the press” to
assert that the First Amendment protects a right to televise on top of the right
of access to the court.144 The First Amendment requires only that the general
public, the newspaper reporter, the radio reporter, and the television reporter
all be “entitled to the same rights” of access.145 Each type of reporter is then
free to report what information she obtains to the public through the media of
her choice.146 The First Amendment does not, however, require that each type
of reporter be entitled to bring into court the reporting technology most
conducive to her type of reporting.147
Thus, even when a newsgatherer has a legal right to be somewhere, she does
not necessarily have a right to film. In 1978, the Supreme Court in Houchins v.
KQED, Inc.148 considered whether reporters who had legal access to a jail
through public tours had a First Amendment right to bring in a camera and take
photographs.149 Three Justices found no First Amendment right to record, even
in a location where reporters already had legal access.150 They reasoned that
newsgatherers have a First Amendment right to gather news, but “that affords
no basis for the claim that the First Amendment compels others—private
persons or governments—to supply information.”151 The government, in other
words, could still ban cameras on its public prison tours. The fourth concurring
Justice suggested that a television reporter might have a special interest in
recording, but still joined the other three in rejecting the right in that case.152
142

381 U.S. 532 (1965).
Id. at 534-35; see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978)
(explaining that neither the First nor the Sixth Amendment requires broadcasting trials to the
public); United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding the exclusion of
cameras from federal courtrooms does not violate the First Amendment).
144 Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
145 Id. at 540.
146 Id. at 541-42.
147 See id. at 540 (“The news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing
press.”).
148 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (4-3 decision).
149 Id. at 3.
150 Id. at 9 (“The public importance of conditions in penal facilities and the media’s role
of providing information afford no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the
public or the media to enter these institutions, with camera equipment, and take moving and
still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes. This Court has never intimated a First
Amendment guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government
control.”).
151 Id. at 11.
152 Id. at 18 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment) (finding the District Court’s
determination “that the media required cameras and recording equipment for effective
presentation to the viewing public of the conditions at the jail” was “sanctioned by the
143
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Since Estes and Houchins, the Supreme Court has held that not all broadcasts
of trials are presumptively unfair,153 while also prohibiting a broadcast where
the trial court failed to follow procedures under federal law.154
While both Estes and Houchins are still good law, courts in recent right-torecord cases have largely ignored both cases. This could indicate that there are
important distinctions between access case law and right-to-record case law,
discussed more below. Or, it might mean that the balance of harms in those
particular environments—a criminal trial and a prison—are different from the
balance in a public forum. Finally, this blind spot could reflect both changing
social norms around recording and changing levels of technological
adoption.155
As courts have recognized a right to record, they have drawn on the
principles underlying First Amendment protection for access and
newsgathering.156 Just as access case law ensures public access where it is
necessary for effective government functions, right-to-record case law protects
the right to record where it contributes to effective and accountable
government behavior, such as policing. Just as access case law protects public
access in places where historically access has been allowed, right-to-record
case law protects recording at least in public fora. And just as protection for
newsgathering requires a balancing of the strength of competing interests,
right-to-record case law appears sensitive to the value of the speech created.
The right to record is not precisely equivalent to an access or newsgathering
right, however. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, most right-to-record cases
are not really access cases.157 When a newsgatherer seeks access to a court
room or a prison, the underlying question is whether she has a right to be there.
When a recording is banned in a public forum, there is no underlying question

Constitution”).
153 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574-75 (1981) (“An absolute constitutional ban on
broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified simply because there is a danger that, in
some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts . . . may impair the ability of jurors to decide the
issue of guilt or innocence . . . .”).
154 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 184 (2010) (per curiam).
155 Chandler, 449 U.S. at 573-74 (“[Estes] does not stand as an absolute ban on state
experimentation with an evolving technology, which, in terms of modes of mass
communication, was in its relative infancy in 1964, and is, even now, in a state of
continuing change.”); see also Kyu Ho Youm, Cameras in the Courtroom in the TwentyFirst Century: The U.S. Supreme Court Learning from Abroad?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1989,
1993-2012.
156 ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)) (finding the ACLU’s challenge to an eavesdropping
statute “draws on the principle that the First Amendment provides at least some degree of
protection for gathering news and information”).
157 Id. at 598 n.7 (“This is not, strictly speaking, a claim about the qualified First
Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings. Access is assumed . . . in
traditional public fora . . . .”).
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of whether the public has a right to be there. A public forum is, by definition, a
place where “time out of mind” the public has already had access.158 The logic
of applying a variation of the access framework to a location where physical
entry is already permitted is strained.
Purely adopting the access framework thus makes little sense when we are
addressing a right to record in public spaces. It should, however, influence how
we address the right in private spaces.159 Some variation on the access
framework is appropriate when we are contemplating a right to record in
private locations or other locations where the public is not legally able to enter
without permission.160 This result—that the scope of the right to record will
differ depending on the recorder’s physical location—is consistent with both
the current state of doctrine and with most scholars’ intuitions.161 But it is not
explicable from a First Amendment perspective alone. To understand why the
scope of the right might differ in different physical locations, we have to
understand why physical location matters.
H.

Recording as Speech Entwined with Action

Once the right to record has been acknowledged, what level of scrutiny
should be applied to the regulation of recording?162 This question is one of the
most difficult puzzles in determining how a right to record would interface
with privacy laws. Courts have thus far indicated that recording is in some way
speech entwined with action; recording is speech that exists in and impacts
physical space and should consequently be scrutinized as such.163

158

See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
See, e.g., Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1028-29. See generally Tom A. Collins,
The Press Clause Construed in Context: The Journalists’ Right of Access to Places, 52 MO.
L. REV. 751 (1987) (analyzing media access to private locations under the access
framework).
160 See S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cty., 499 F.3d 553, 560 n.2 (6th Cir.
2007) (analyzing whether there was an access right to enter and record in a park, and
concluding that “[w]hile the Supreme Court has developed a framework for analyzing
access cases dealing with the special issue of access to judicial proceedings . . . such a
framework is missing in access cases outside of the judicial-proceeding context”).
161 See, e.g., Blitz, supra note 2, at 149; Kreimer, supra note 2, at 398; Marceau & Chen,
supra note 2, at 1027.
162 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 105 (indicating that the level of scrutiny depends on
the context); Blitz, et al., supra note 2, at 111 (arguing the public forum doctrine provides
the framework for determining what level of scrutiny to apply); Marceau & Chen, supra
note 2, at 997 n.26 (“[T]he location or nature of the recording may have an impact on the
relevant level of scrutiny applicable to speech restriction.”). I believe that, when in private
locations the right is limited to matters of public concern, it is a matter of salience, not
scrutiny.
163 See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (performing
analysis under the time, place, and manner standard without deciding on whether that
standard is generally applicable); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
159
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Usually, First Amendment doctrine addresses speech entwined with action
by applying either the test from United States v. O’Brien,164 or the “time, place,
and manner” test. The O’Brien test requires that government regulation (1) be
within the constitutional power of government; (2) further an important or
substantial government interest; (3) be unrelated to the deliberate suppression
of speech; and (4) incidentally restrict speech no more than is necessary to
further the governmental interest.165 The O’Brien test allows courts to
determine when a law impacting speech is not aimed at speech and is,
therefore, constitutional. The time, place, and manner test similarly requires
courts to ascertain whether the government is impermissibly targeting speech
or aiming the regulation at other concerns.166
A law governing trespass or physical safety would usually easily pass both
tests even if it incidentally impacted somebody’s right to record. For example,
if a state passed a law prohibiting trespass by a drone into private airspace, the
aim of that law—to protect private property—would be unrelated to the
suppression of speech, and the law would likely be constitutional even if it
prevented a drone videographer from accessing particular information.167 If a
state passed a law prohibiting photographers from standing in the middle of a
public street, the aim of that law—to enable the flow of traffic and prevent
accidents—would also be unrelated to the suppression of speech, and the law
would likely be constitutional even if it prevented a photographer from taking
a photograph from a particular perspective.
The great difficulty with respect to privacy regulations is as follows: both
the O’Brien test and the time, place, and manner test require a government
interest that is unrelated to speech suppression.168 Recording comes within the
scope of First Amendment coverage purportedly because it is in some way
inextricably related to speech. Thus, an interest that requires banning recording
seems to always be an interest related to the suppression of speech. In other
words, governing recording initially appears to always target communicative
rather than noncommunicative activity.169

164

391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Id.
166 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
167
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (2015).
168 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified
if . . . the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.”); see also
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
169 See Bambauer, supra note 2, at 63 (“[S]tate action will trigger the First Amendment
any time it purposefully interferes with the creation of knowledge. . . . Privacy regulations
are rarely incidental burdens to knowledge. Instead they are deliberately designed to disrupt
knowledge creation.”); Kreimer, supra note 2, at 390-91 (“Laws that prohibit the capture of
images by definition interfere with the individual practice of preserving experience for
future review, reflection, and expression—a practice that is entitled to protection under the
First Amendment.”); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1021 (“[S]tate action that directly
165
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If we look at the other examples of how nonspeech harms have been
separated from protected speech interests, the relative uniqueness of this
difficulty becomes clearer. The government can regulate parades because,
while they are expressive activity, parades have nonexpressive impacts on the
physical environment, such as crowding streets, causing noise, or obstructing
the usual traffic flow.170 The government can set regulations governing the
time of a parade, the place where it occurs, and the manner in which it
occurs.171 Similarly, the government can govern sound trucks, which clearly
communicate a message, but may also create an unpleasant volume of noise.172
The government cannot aim its regulation at the message being communicated,
but it can aim its regulation at the level of noise that communication creates.173
One of the requirements of such regulations is that there be other available
channels of communication; the noise can be addressed, but the person must
still be able to communicate her message.174
How would this work in the privacy and recording context? It cannot, unless
there is some way to separate the privacy interest in preventing recording from
the communicative aspect of recording. Recording, unlike a parade or a sound
truck, does not communicate a message that is readily separable from the
regulable aspects of the act. The act and the communicative elements are
coextensive. If recording itself creates the privacy harm, you cannot solve the
problem by recording something in a way that is less harmful to privacy.175

restricts non-consensual investigative video recordings implicates First Amendment speech
concerns.”). But see Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1054 (asserting that it does not make sense to
treat all information gathering as speech); Blitz, supra note 2, at 192 (“[P]rivacy interests in
restricting information may, at times, outweigh First Amendment interests in informationgathering.”); Campbell, supra note 31, at 50-51 (“Targeted regulations of audiovisual
recording . . . single out conduct commonly associated with expression and impose an
apparent disproportionate burden on speech.”); McDonald, supra note 102, at 271 (arguing
that eavesdropping laws do not target speech).
170 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (“[T]he Court has
recognized that the government . . . may impose a permit requirement on those wishing to
hold a . . . parade . . . . [A]ny permit scheme controlling the time, place, and manner of
speech must not be based on the content of the message, must be narrowly tailored to serve
a significant government interest, and must leave open ample alternatives for
communication.” (citations omitted)).
171 Id.
172 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949).
173 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 792; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567
(2011) (“It is also true that the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at
commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”).
174 See, e.g., Forsyth Cty., 505 U.S. at 130.
175 Recordings can be more or less harmful to privacy—they can be de-identified so that
faces are obscured and voices are distorted, among other things. However, most government
regulations of recording target recordings of identifiable individuals and do not contemplate
de-identification as a mitigating factor.
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Of course, the same argument could be made for sound trucks and parades.
Some scholars have convincingly argued that a parade or protest is much less
effective at communicating its message when it can be relegated to a different
location.176 Sound trucks are similarly less effective at communicating if they
have to be quieter. But the problem is even more pronounced with respect to
the recording right. While message and noise level can ostensibly be separated,
recording and recording at first glance cannot.
III. PRIVACY AS ACTION
Courts have tentatively treated the right to record as though it is speech that
exists in a physical space.177 Even scholars who adamantly support a right to
record have contemplated differences in its scope based on physical
location.178 But why? Pressing a button to record something is a physical act,
but this alone does not explain why courts should employ speech doctrine that
addresses or at least acknowledges physical spaces. Turning a page is physical;
clicking through a webpage is physical; pressing play on a DVD player is
physical. Technically, all speech takes place in physical space. Yet some
speech is treated as abstracted (e.g., the Internet), and other speech is
inseparable from its physical embodiment (e.g., burning a flag).179
Harm often defines the contours of First Amendment coverage and
protection.180 Despite the Supreme Court’s purported speech absolutism—its
outright refusal in several recent cases to balance speech against other
harms181—much of First Amendment doctrinal development has consisted not

176

See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 581 (2006)
(“Place can be a powerful weapon of social and political control.”).
177 “[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information.’” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
178 See Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 90-91; Kreimer, supra note 2, at 393 (outlining three
principles that set boundaries for prohibitions on image capture, including that where rules
“seek to protect the privacy of intimate venues,” further analysis of the competing interests
is required); Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1027 (“[T]he protection of recording as
speech activity, particularly on private property, is not self-evident as a doctrinal matter.”).
179 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
180 This claim is related to the idea that First Amendment analysis consists of sniffing out
impermissible government motives, but differs in that it looks to the category of harm
created. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 413-14 (1996) (suggesting
that First Amendment analysis should focus on government motives).
181 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2540-41 (2012); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
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of asking whether some act is protected as speech, but of implicitly balancing
the protection of expression with harms.182
The right to parade is, thus, a right to parade subject to time, place, and
manner restrictions.183 The right to burn a flag is a right to burn a flag subject
to government regulations of arson.184 The right to make inflammatory
speeches is a right to do so as long as the speech is not so entwined with
lawless action (or violence) that the action is both imminent and likely to
occur.185
Strict scrutiny itself is notoriously fatal in fact.186 But strict scrutiny’s scope
is relatively limited: it applies to “pure” speech and to regulatory efforts that
target particular topics or speakers.187 Once a court determines that the
contemplated harm is not a speech harm, its analytical framework usually
changes from strict scrutiny to something else.188 For all that the current
Supreme Court has disavowed harm balancing, this shift from the analysis of
pure speech to other frameworks occurs surprisingly often in First Amendment
doctrine.189
Admittedly, the United States defines speech-related harms more broadly
than other countries. Harms to reputation, from hate speech, from the portrayal
of violent or sexually demeaning acts, and from the publication of ostensibly
private information, have all been considered too closely entwined with speech
to merit distinct treatment or more deferential balancing.190 These kinds of

182

See Bhagwat, supra note 2, at 1035 (“[P]roducing speech can involve a wide range of
conduct that can cause social harm entirely independent of the communicative impact of the
eventual speech.”).
183 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make clear,
however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”); cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995) (stating that “parades
are . . . a form of expression,” and are, therefore, subject to First Amendment analysis).
184 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968).
185 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
186 See Gunther, supra note 21, at 8. But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in
Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793,
796 (2006) (arguing that empirical data suggests that strict scrutiny is “survivable in fact”).
187 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 565 (2011); United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
188 See generally Bhagwat, supra note 33 (describing the shift from strict to intermediate
scrutiny of First Amendment claims).
189 See id. at 831.
190 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1992); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (noting that First Amendment principles
require open “debate on public issues” even if that debate “may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”).
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speech harms trigger either strict scrutiny or the carefully calibrated
application of one of the historical exemptions to speech protection.191 But
when the contemplated harm is entwined with government management of the
features of physical space, the analytical framework changes. When the harm
is situated in physical, rivalrous space, the government is given “somewhat
wider leeway to regulate features of speech unrelated to its content.”192
Again, take parades as an example. First Amendment protection of parades
leaves room for government regulations aimed at managing qualities of
physical space so the protected speech is not too disruptive to the behavior of
others in that space.193 We all share physical space, and one person’s loud
sound truck is another person’s inability to read her book.194 The scope of First
Amendment protections for speech that occur in physical space is calibrated
against the government’s need to manage those environments so that other
citizens can speak, think, live, and thrive in them. Likewise, First Amendment
doctrine allows for government protection of the “captive audience,” who can
be protected from speech when that speech inescapably interferes with her
ability to go about her business in a particular physical environment.195
The kind of privacy implicated by recording triggers this kind of
government interest. The government’s interest in governing recording is, I
contend, an interest in managing the qualities of the physical environment so
that one citizen’s behavior is not too disruptive to the behavior of another
person in that space so that it creates unacceptable costs. Just as First
Amendment treatment of parades, sound trucks, and flag-burning requires an
understanding of the government’s interest in preventing a nonspeech harm,
First Amendment treatment of a right to record requires an understanding of
the privacy interest.
“Privacy” can mean very different things.196 Crucially, privacy in the
context of publication is different from privacy in the context of recording. The
191

Many of these exemptions developed as the First Amendment began to be applied to
state laws protecting against dignitary harms. See Bhagwat, supra note 33, at 805.
192 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
193 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989).
194 See McDonald, supra note 102, at 266-67 (“Whenever one is granted a ‘right’ or
‘freedom’ to engage in certain conduct, other members of society incur a corresponding
obligation to tolerate that conduct. In other words . . . one person’s freedoms are another
person’s chains. . . . [B]y acting in a more physical manner, chances increase that such
actions will impinge upon important freedoms of others.”).
195 See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2310-11 (1999); Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 946 (2009) (“[T]he question is not whether the audience can
avoid the message by leaving a particular location . . . but whether they should have to.”);
Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda S. Wu, Of Buffer Zones and Broken Bones: Balancing Access
to Abortion and Anti-Abortion Protestors’ First Amendment Rights in Schenck v. ProChoice Network, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 547, 578 (1996).
196 See generally SOLOVE, supra note 10.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Bartnicki reflects this intuition.197 “Privacy” in
the context of publication is often an interest in preventing a dignitary, speechrelated harm—harm that results from exactly what makes publication
powerful: the amplification of a piece of information and the emotional
reaction of the person receiving it.198 First Amendment doctrine has been
notoriously skeptical towards protecting against the amplification of private
information, because such protection allows the government to interfere in
both the editorial process and the persuasion of other people.199
“Privacy” in the context of recording, however, is a different thing. It is
physically situated.200 As described at greater length below, an individual uses
known features of her physical environment to manage her social accessibility
at a given moment in time and space.201 These environmental features include
physical barriers, distance, and even the dispersal of social interactions over
time. Recording changes that physical environment through technology that
closes observable distances and permeates physical barriers, collapses
temporally dispersed interactions, and broadens the potential audience to an
interaction beyond the people physically present.
Changes to a physical environment have real consequences for how an
individual behaves—including behavior related to expression.202 Changing a
physical environment by permitting recording does not necessarily alter an
individual’s ideal calibration of social accessibility; it often causes that
individual to change her behavior instead.203 Sometimes, that behavioral
change may be socially desirable, promoting better behavior by public
servants. This is the primary argument behind equipping police with body
cameras or allowing citizens to record the police.204 Other times, this
197

See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 526, 531 (2001).
Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, supra note 3, at 360.
199 See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534-35 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 471 (1975); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 337 (1991) (“On a general level, freedom of speech is
valued precisely because speech has the capacity to persuade.”). But see L.A. Police Dep’t
v. United Reporting Publ’g Co., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).
200 Kaminski, supra note 11, at 1113; see also ALTMAN, supra note 11, at vii.
201 See discussion infra Section III.A.
202
See Froomkin, supra note 64, at 1727, 1743 (observing the chilling effect of
surveillance on speech, association, and individual liberty).
203 Cf. ALTMAN, supra note 11, at 86-94 (discussing how intrusion into personal space
changes behavior).
204 See Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras, supra note 66, at 1560; Simonson,
Copwatching, supra note 66, at 413; Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With
Right Policies in Place, a Win for All, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all
[https://perma.cc/MF9F-XESD] (“Although we at the ACLU generally take a dim view of
the proliferation of surveillance cameras in American life, police on-body cameras are
different because of their potential to serve as a check against the abuse of power by police
198
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behavioral change may be socially undesirable, for example causing jurors to
grandstand for their neighbors and friends.205 But just as the government has a
legitimate interest in preventing sound trucks and parades from disrupting the
behavior of other citizens in shared sociophysical spaces, it sometimes (not
always) has a legitimate interest in governing recording to prevent undesirable
changes to others’ behavior, and consequent costs.
Understanding the privacy interest in this way explains the two biggest
puzzles in the right-to-record doctrine: (1) why the right appears to differ in
scope in different locations; and (2) how the privacy interest can be conceived
of as distinct from an interest in suppressing speech. Both of these puzzles are
explicable by understanding the privacy harm as situated in physical, temporal
space.
This Part defines the kind of privacy implicated by recording and protected
in recording laws. It explains how an interest in protecting this kind of privacy
is distinct from an interest in suppressing speech. It closes by identifying that
this kind of privacy—the management of social accessibility using features of
the physical environment—has been acknowledged as a protectable interest by
courts, including the Supreme Court. In fact, the Supreme Court has
recognized that protecting this kind of privacy is itself often protective of free
expression. First Amendment interests, in other words, arise on both sides.
A.

Privacy as Physically Situated

Privacy in the context of recording is the ability of an individual to
dynamically manage her social accessibility at a particular moment, given
known features of the physical environment.206 This kind of privacy is
environmentally situated. For example, an individual in her living room may
rely on the height of a fence, the distance between the street and her house, the
walls of her home, and shades on her windows to prevent people on the street
from seeing her. She consequently may feel freer to indulge in behaviors in the
home that she would not necessarily want seen by the general public, from
reading dissident literature to picking her nose.207 Those home-based behaviors
may be socially beneficial: they may allow for the exploration of new ideas
and the development of new facets of an individual’s identity; and they may

officers.”).
205 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1965).
206 Kaminski, supra note 11, at 1116; see also ALTMAN, supra note 11, at 11 (“My view
is that privacy is profitably conceived of as an interplay of opposing forces—that is,
difference balances of opening and closing the self to others.”); Gavison, supra note 12, at
423 (arguing that our interest in privacy “is related to our concern over our accessibility to
others,” which “enables us to identify when losses of privacy occur”).
207 Kaminski, supra note 11, at 1136 (citing as an example that a person might do a silly
dance in her office every morning before answering emails, relying on barriers such as walls
and fourth story building height).
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serve as an outlet for energies that are repressed in public spaces.208 If a
recording or information-gathering device can access that space (effectively
removing physical walls by, say, using thermal imaging),209 then an
individual’s calibration of her social accessibility will either be woefully
inaccurate, or she will change her behavior.
An interest in protecting privacy can be understood as an autonomy
interest.210 It is an interest in enabling individuals to use their environment to
make calculations about the personally appropriate degree of social exposure,
based on features of their physical space, regardless of whether they are in
public or private.211 That interest will not always trump free speech concerns,
but sometimes it will. Sometimes, it will protect and enable some expression at
the same time that it discourages other expression.
The government’s interest in governing recording is twofold. The first
interest is an interest in enabling individuals to accurately manage their social
accessibility, given changes to the physical environment wrought by
technological development.212 States have enacted eavesdropping laws that

208 See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1-16 (1973)
(proposing that humans perform the self socially, in different contexts, wearing different
“masks” for different people); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)
(describing privacy as allowing for withdrawal from public performance).
209 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that use of a thermalimaging device to scan a home for illegal marijuana growth constitutes a Fourth
Amendment “search”).
210 It need not be understood only as an autonomy interest. It can also be understood as
protective of democracy and community values, or as an understanding of the self as
embedded in social relationships.
211 One of the great fallacies of First Amendment analysis is that privacy interests either
do not exist in public or minimally exist in public. This is incorrect. See Shulman v. Grp. W
Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1988) (“[T]here is no liability for the examination of a
public record concerning the plaintiff. . . . [Or] for observing him or even taking his
photograph while he is walking on the public highway. . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977))); Aisenson v. Am.
Broad. Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that any invasion of
privacy due to filming in a public street was de minimis); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255
N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (“[I]t is manifest that the mere observation of the plaintiff in a
public place does not amount to an invasion of his privacy.”); McNamara v. Freedom
Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no invasion of
privacy and strong First Amendment interests “[w]hen an individual is photographed at a
public place for a newsworthy article and that photograph is published”). But see Kaminski,
supra note 11, at 1116-18; Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 101, 111-12 (2004); Reidenberg, supra note 2, at 148.
212 See Kaminski, supra note 11, at 1135 (“First, the government may have an interest in
preventing people from miscalculating their boundaries. Second, the government may have
an interest in preserving a particular genre of boundary management—not out of nostalgia
or fear of technological change, but because of the problems that might occur if one forces
people to shift boundary management tactics.”). Michael Froomkin describes such
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prohibit surreptitious eavesdropping—that is, recording an overheard
conversation.213 If a person has notice of the recording, the recording is not
illegal. This makes sense from a privacy perspective: if a person has notice of
the recording, whether actual or constructive, she will be able to recalibrate her
behavior accordingly, with the knowledge that it will be seen or heard by a
wider audience. Many recording laws thus have notice requirements; they ban
surreptitious recording but allow recording with notice.214
Alternatively, the government may recognize that, even with notice, some
behavioral changes caused by recording are particularly undesirable. This is
the second government interest. People often manage social accessibility based
on longstanding assumptions about a particular type of physical space. They
employ, in the words of the relevant literature, “genres” of behavioral
management.215 You may have one type of behavior that you employ on a
crowded public street and another that you employ in an empty public park.
Or, to delink the concept from particular physical locations, you may employ
one type of behavior when interacting with a close friend and another when
interacting with your boss. The government can have a legitimate, nonspeechrelated interest in preserving the settings within which a particular type of
behavior occurs—not to prevent speech about a particular relationship or
locale, but to prevent the costs of undesirable behavioral shifts. In fact, the
government can have a legitimate, speech-preserving interest in preventing
speech from being chilled by changes to the trusted environment.
Some argue that this interest is still irrevocably linked to the distribution of
information. The argument goes as follows: people change their behavior when
they are being recorded or watched because, in large part, they fear
downstream distribution to others. And, since First Amendment law clearly
protects distribution, this interest in protecting privacy is clearly an interest in
preventing speech.

unforeseen surveillance as an externality. Froomkin, supra note 64, at 1729, 1732.
213 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31(a) (2016) (describing “[c]riminal eavesdropping”
as when a person “intentionally uses a[] device to eavesdrop”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a)
(West 2010) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as when a person “intentionally and
without . . . consent . . . eavesdrops upon or records . . . confidential communication”);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-304(1)(a)-(c) (2016) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as when a
person not present for a conversation “[k]nowingly overhears or records such conversation
or discussion without [] consent . . . [or] for the purpose of committing, aiding, or abetting
the commission of an unlawful act; or [k]nowingly . . . attempts to use or disclose . . . the
contents of any such conversation or discussion”).
214 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(1) (Supp. 2016) (defining “[e]avesdropping” as
any attempt “in a clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or record . . . the
private conversation of another which shall originate in any private place”).
215 Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World,
PROCEEDINGS SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS., no. 1, Apr. 2003, at 129,
133 (referring to “genres of disclosure”).
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I disagree. Privacy literature—and, it should be noted, significant parts of
privacy law—recognizes that privacy harms can occur at the moment of
recording or observation, even absent distribution to others.216 Arguing that a
government interest in preventing recording is equivalent to a government
interest in preventing distribution ignores this effect.217 Take the following
example, drawn from a scholar who ostensibly believes that privacy harms
occur only at distribution: one of the reasons for recording police officers is to
get them to change their behavior at the moment they are being recorded.218 At
the moment of recording, nothing has been distributed, and perhaps may never
be distributed.219 Yet, police change their behavior nonetheless. This argument
for protecting police recording even absent distribution rests on the same
premise for distinguishing harms at recording from harms at distribution. A
law targeting recording is aimed at changes of behavior in real time, in real
space; a law targeting distribution is more likely to be aimed at a
communicative moment between distributor and audience. And, just to be
clear: while the change in police behavior can technically be characterized as a
privacy harm, under every theory of the First Amendment, it does not
outweigh the speech interests. Usually such a change in behavior is actually
desirable from a speech perspective; it improves government functions and,
thus, strengthens the argument for speech protection, while being minimally
undesirable from a privacy perspective.
Even when an individual changes her behavior because she thinks that a
recording will be distributed, this does not make the government interest in
preventing recording equivalent to a government interest in preventing
distribution. Trying to prevent the costs of a behavioral change when
somebody believes a recording will be distributed is not the same thing as
trying to target a communicative moment between speaker and subject. One
involves no thought as to downstream audience persuasion while the other
does. One involves a focus on actions taking place in a physical environment
while the other involves a focus on a disembodied communications medium.
Thus, there is a twofold, nonspeech-related government interest in
governing recording: (1) enabling the accurate management of social

216 See SOLOVE, supra note 10, at 9; Froomkin, supra note 64, at 1743 (“Yet for many,
the knowledge that one is being observed and recorded—or even that there is a substantial
likelihood of being surveilled—is itself a harm that not only chills speech, but generally
inhibits freedom and self-realization.”); Kevin S. Bankston & Amie Stepanovich, When
Robot Eyes Are Watching 3 (2014) (unpublished draft) (on file with author) (arguing that
automated reading of emails increases privacy concerns, regardless of whether a human ever
reads the email). But see Bruce E. Boyden, Can a Computer Intercept Your Email?, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 669, 676 (2012).
217 See Kreimer, supra note 2, at 404 (positing that privacy harms occur only at
distribution).
218 Kreimer, supra note 2, at 404.
219 See, e.g., Fields v. City of Phila., 166 F. Supp. 3d 528, 535-36 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
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accessibility, and (2) preserving particular behavior in particular spaces to
avoid societal costs of behavioral changes. These two interests are strikingly
similar to the government interests in governing protests, parades, and sound
trucks.220 The first is an interest in allowing other users of a shared physical
space to adapt their behavior by providing knowledge of recording or
information gathering. This is the interest protected by allowing time and place
restrictions on parades and by requiring parade permits. Requiring parade
permits allows other individuals to have knowledge of a parade route and to
route around the parade. This interest in preventing the disruption of others
may not be an interest that should trump First Amendment concerns, but in
practice, that is what the doctrine often allows.
The second interest is recognized in both the parade and sound truck
contexts by allowing the government to consider the impact of noise levels on
other peoples’ lives. Even in the First Amendment context, the government has
a recognized interest in protecting behavior in rivalrous spaces from undue
disruption, where that disruption would cause shifts in behavior that in turn
have significant social costs.221
B.

Situated Privacy in the Case Law

Many cases have recognized this situated concept of privacy. This is not to
say that this privacy interest has always triumphed over other values or that
courts have explicitly identified it as a privacy interest. Courts have
consistently recognized, however, that if we fail to protect certain
sociophysical settings or certain features of those settings, behavioral shifts
will occur. They have recognized the importance of the nature of physical
space in relationship management, even in First Amendment case law. And
they have explicitly recognized that First Amendment interests often arise on
the side of privacy laws, not just against them, because privacy protections can
enable disclosure within trusted relationships and in trusted sociophysical
spaces.
1.

Privacy in the Home

The first set of examples of this privacy interest occur in an environment
that most people concede is private: the home. The Supreme Court has, in the
First Amendment context, repeatedly recognized a valid government interest in
protecting the ability of individuals to enjoy undisrupted tranquility in the
home—in other words, protecting individuals from having to change their
behavior.222 In these cases, individuals receive protection for their decisions to

220

See Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 133 (identifying relevance of unwilling listener cases,
though not linking them to the government interest in protecting this particular kind of
privacy).
221 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
222 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
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manage the tranquility of the home environment and are not required to alter
their behavior to accommodate others’ speech interests.
In Frisby v. Schultz,223 the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting picketing
that targeted a particular residence.224 The Court conceived of residential
privacy as the ability of an “unwilling listener” to be free from speech that
“inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy.”225 Similarly, in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,226 the Court upheld regulations of sound volume
at a public concert, reasoning that the concert would cause “unwelcome noise”
disruptive of life in residential neighborhoods.227 The Court in Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department228 upheld a law allowing homeowners to
refuse the delivery of offensive materials by mail, again reasoning that to do
otherwise could disrupt a homeowner’s control over the home environment.229
In these cases, the Court recognized that privacy involves the connection
between a physical environment and a person’s behavior. The Court did not
just respect the home as private because it is privately owned or because it is
not open to many people. The Court recognized that the privacy interest in the
home involves decisions to maintain an environment that is uninterrupted and
tranquil.230 The home is a space where a person has the ability to behave the
way she likes, without interference in her behavior by outside actors.
The interest in maintaining tranquility and controlling access to the home is
an autonomy interest. In Rowan, the Supreme Court characterized the purpose
of the mail delivery statute as enabling a person to manage his accessibility in
the home.231 The Court characterized this law not just as protecting a particular
space, but as protecting a home occupant’s autonomy interest in controlling
access to that space.232
Recording disrupts the nature of a physical space. If loud sounds, targeted
picketing, and the delivery of mail are disruptive enough to a homeowner’s

474, 484-85 (1988); Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); see also
Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 133. I disagree, here, with Justin Marceau and Alan Chen, who
claim that the unwilling listener cases protect individuals only from undesired and
disturbing messages being communicated and understood as messages. Marceau & Chen,
supra note 2, at 1043. I read the cases to be about disruption and the First Amendment, more
broadly speaking. But see ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 2012).
223
487 U.S. 474 (1988).
224 Id. at 488 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
225 Id. at 484, 486.
226 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
227 Id. at 796.
228 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
229 Id. at 738.
230 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
231 Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738.
232 Id. at 736 (“[A] sufficient measure of individual autonomy must survive to permit
every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail.”).
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management of the home environment to trump First Amendment interests,
recording in the home environment may be, too.233
2.

Situated Privacy and Exposure to Different Audiences

The home is in many ways the easy case. Protection for privacy in the home
is paramount in case law.234 Even for those who understand privacy merely in
contrast to publicity, the home is the place of least exposure to the outside
world.235 Courts have recognized, however, that privacy can exist outside of
the home and that exposure to one audience does not obviate a privacy interest
with respect to other audiences.
The Supreme Court has recognized what are essentially privacy interests in
a variety of non-home settings. Recall that in Estes v. Texas, the Court
concluded that televising a criminal trial violated the due process rights of the
criminal defendant.236 The Court reasoned that recording the trial would cause
participants to change their behavior because they would be conscious of the
expanded audience.237 Those behavioral changes would be so socially
undesirable in the context of a trial that the Court found that recording should
not be allowed in these circumstances. Thus, the Court condoned a ban on
recording a criminal trial, even where access case law required public access to

233 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it
is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.”); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir.
1971) (“Plaintiff’s den was a sphere from which he could reasonably expect to exclude
eavesdropping . . . . [H]e does not and should not be required to take the risk that what is
heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording . . . .”); see also Desnick v.
Am. Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing Dietemann as
happening in the home).
234 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (“[P]reserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to
which men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is
surely an important value.” (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980))).
235 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 101, 111-12
(2004).
236 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1965).
237 Id. at 544-45. A televised juror might fear community hostility, “realizing that he
must return to neighbors who saw the trial themselves,” and thus “may well be led ‘not to
hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused . . . .’” Id. at 545
(quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)). Judges, too, might change their
behavior. Id. at 548. Witnesses may “be demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given
to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of
statement may be severely undermined. Embarrassment may impede the search for the truth,
as may a natural tendency toward overdramatization.” Id. at 547. The Court even recognized
the impact on the defendant’s attorney: introducing recording could have grave
consequences for fair representation of the defendant, whose attorney may be tempted “to
play to the public audience.” Id. at 549.
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that trial.238 This effectively recognizes a privacy interest, as defined here, in a
courtroom, a location clearly outside of the home. It also recognizes a
continued privacy interest with respect to the public, even though information
had already been disclosed to those participating in the trial and even to the
press.
The Supreme Court again recognized that exposure to one audience does not
obviate a privacy interest with respect to another audience in Houchins v.
KQED, Inc.239 The Court recognized that prison inmates have a privacy
interest in not being recorded and broadcast by a television station.240 The
Court recognized this interest despite the fact that prison is largely a nonprivate
environment with respect to the government.241
The Court has similarly addressed “media ride-alongs” with police and
found a Fourth Amendment violation where police brought news media into a
person’s home, even though the police were legally present with a valid
warrant.242 Despite the fact that the police were legally allowed to be in the
home to arrest an individual, the Court recognized a privacy interest with
respect to the news media and its audience.243 These cases and others show a
more nuanced understanding of privacy on the part of the Supreme Court:
privacy does not only pertain to isolation in the home, but also to the dynamic
management of exposure to different audiences, even if one audience already
has permission to be there.244
3.

Situated Privacy and Buffer Zones

Without necessarily characterizing the government interest as an interest in
privacy, the Court has, in a series of cases, recognized a strong government
interest in preserving behavior in the context of specific physical spaces, all of
which were outside of the home. The government interest in preventing the
disruption of behavior in rivalrous physical spaces has, on multiple occasions,
overcome a First Amendment interest.
In Boos v. Barry,245 the Court found that the government interest in
preventing the disruption of behavior in an embassy justified a ban on

238

Id. at 540.
438 U.S. 1 (1978).
240 Id. at 5 n.2 (“It is true that inmates lose many rights when they are lawfully confined,
but they do not lose all civil rights. Inmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutions retain
certain fundamental rights of privacy; they are not like animals in a zoo to be filmed and
photographed at will by the public or by media reporters, however ‘educational’ the process
may be for others.” (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974))).
241 Id. at 8.
242 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605 (1999).
243 Id. at 611.
244 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 164 (2002).
245 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
239
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congregating in a public forum 500 feet outside the embassy.246 Despite the
nature of the space—a public forum—and the highly protected nature of the
speech at issue—on matters of public concern—the Court found in Boos that
the congregation law was appropriately “crafted for a particular context
and . . . it is apparent that the ‘prohibited quantum of disturbance’ is whether
normal embassy activities have been or are about to be disrupted.”247 Without
calling this a privacy interest, the Court chose to preserve a particular category
of behavior in rivalrous physical space against real First Amendment interests
in protesting against embassy activity.
In a series of cases, the Court considered the government interest in
protecting entrance and egress at healthcare facilities (that is, abortion
facilities) from disruption by stationed protestors and petitioners. In Hill v.
Colorado,248 the Court upheld a Colorado law creating an eight-foot floating
buffer zone around a person within 100 feet of every healthcare facility.249 A
protestor or petitioner could approach a person within that buffer zone only
with permission. The Court in Hill recognized the government’s interest in
protecting the unwilling listener as a “privacy interest” that “varies widely in
different settings.”250 That interest was not limited to the home, or to private
enclosed spaces. It could exist even “in ‘the Sheep Meadow’ portion of Central
Park.”251 The strength of this privacy interest depends, the Court noted, on both
social and physical context.252
The government interest in Hill was articulated not as an interest in
protecting unwilling listeners from offensive speech, but as an interest in
protecting them from the moment of “deliberate ‘verbal or visual assault’” in a
rivalrous physical setting.253 The Court recognized that such an “assault”
would likely cause a change in behavior and that the government has a
legitimate interest in protecting individuals in that context from undue

246

Id. at 331, 334. Elsewhere, I have argued that Boos impinges on the First Amendment
right to peaceably assemble. Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash
Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (2012). I discuss below some limitations of the analysis in
Boos, including the Court’s lack of attentiveness to the right to peaceably assemble.
247 Boos, 485 U.S. at 332 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112
(1972)).
248 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
249 Id. at 718.
250 Id. at 716.
251 Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989)).
252 Id. at 717 (“The right to avoid unwelcome speech has special force in the privacy of
the home . . . and its immediate surroundings, . . . but can also be protected in
confrontational settings.” (citations omitted)).
253 Id. at 716 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 n.6 (1975)); see
also Corbin, supra note 195, at 945-46.
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disruptions to their behavior.254 In Hill, the buffer-zone law was found to be
content-neutral and survived application of the time, place, and manner test.255
Similarly, in Burson v. Freeman,256 the Court upheld a 100-foot election-day
buffer zone around voting locations.257 The Court found the law in Burson to
in fact be content based and, consequently, applied strict scrutiny.258 The law
nonetheless survived strict scrutiny because of the strength of the
government’s interest in protecting voters from undue influence and protecting
the integrity of the election.259
While the Court again did not explicitly describe this interest as a privacy
interest, it described the effect of the law in what should by now be familiar
terms. Failure to limit the area around the voter on the day of an election could
result in intimidation by employers and others.260 This interference, resulting in
changed behavior by the voter, would disrupt the integrity of the vote.
Protecting the secrecy of the vote by protecting the area around the voter was
an acceptable interest in preventing voter behavior change.261 It effectively is
an interest in protecting voter privacy.
The above case law should be read with important caveats. First, the cases
give little thought to the First Amendment right to peaceably assemble, which
should afford heightened protection for protestors.262 Restricting the right of
individuals to peaceably assemble has significant implications for democratic
society under all theories of the First Amendment.263 Second, many
commentators have looked at these cases as poor examples of First
Amendment reasoning.264 They are, however, current doctrine, and inasmuch
as this Article attempts to work within the existing doctrinal framework, they
254

Hill, 530 U.S. at 716 (“[W]e have recognized that ‘[t]he First Amendment does not
demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the
cacophony of political protests.’” (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 772-73 (1994))).
255 Id. at 724.
256 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
257 Id. at 211.
258 Id. at 198.
259 Id. at 199.
260 Id. at 204 (“One commentator remarked of the New York law of 1888: ‘We have
secured secrecy; and intimidation by employers, party bosses, police officers, saloonkeepers
and others has come to an end.’”).
261 Id. at 207-08 (“The only way to preserve the secrecy of the ballot is to limit access to
the area around the voter.”).
262 Kaminski, supra note 246, at 36. I have not previously contemplated the scenario
where a host of peaceable videographers stand in a particular area and simultaneously
peaceably assemble and record what’s going on around them. For purposes of this Article,
two different kinds of rights are at issue in that fact pattern. It may be that the government
can more readily regulate the recording than the protest, or vice versa.
263 Id. at 37.
264 See, e.g., Zick, supra note 176, at 583-89.
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are legitimate sources of law. Third, even within the doctrinal framework that
these cases establish, it is not clear that the Court correctly evaluated the
strength of the government interest. The government interest in, say, protecting
the genre of behavior that occurs within an embassy is not necessarily a strong
privacy interest. Embassies are sites of public governance that might expect to
regularly encounter protests. The abortion-provider cases are more
complicated; although the sites might expect to regularly encounter protests,
patients’ privacy interests are stronger than those of embassy employees.
While these cases are subject to legitimate criticism in how they assess the
strength of the protestors’ rights and the strength of the government’s interest,
they set up the currently operable doctrinal framework for weighing First
Amendment rights against disruptions to a physical environment.
The Court in Snyder v. Phelps265 recently assessed a privacy interest outside
of the home under a different doctrinal framework.266 What is surprising,
however, is that the Court nodded to the same privacy interests articulated
throughout this Article. In Snyder, the Court considered whether protestors
from the Westboro Baptist Church could be held liable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and intrusion upon seclusion for staging a protest near a
military funeral.267 The regulation at issue was not content neutral—it turned
on the reaction of listeners to the speech—and thus failed to pass the Court’s
scrutiny.268
Even in Snyder, however, the Court acknowledged a legitimate government
interest in preventing behavioral disturbances in shared public spaces.269 The
Court explained that church members were not disruptive of the funeral
service; the picketing occurred 1000 feet from the church, out of sight, and
“[t]he protest was not unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence.”270
The Court distinguished the unwilling listener cases of Rowan and Frisby, not
because they involved the privacy of the home, but because “there is no
indication that the picketing in any way interfered with the funeral service
itself.”271 The strong implication is that there may be a valid and substantial
government interest in preventing interference with or disruption of behavior at
funerals that, unlike the regulation at issue in Snyder, might survive First
Amendment scrutiny.272

265

562 U.S. 443 (2011).
Id. at 451.
267 Id. at 447.
268 Id. at 457 (“The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboro’s picketing
turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any interference
with the funeral itself.”).
269 Id. at 456.
270 Id. at 457.
271 Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
272 The Court considered the possibility of buffer zones around funerals. Id. at 457 (“To
the extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different questions from the tort
266

214

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:167

The Court in Snyder, in fact, went a step further than in other cases,
implying that behavioral disruption in shared spaces could even be taken into
account in strict scrutiny analysis of a content-based law. In considering
whether Westboro Baptist Church could invoke the First Amendment as a
defense to state tort claims, the Court emphasized that the speech must be on a
matter of public concern.273 The Court then outlined a test for determining
whether speech is on a “matter of public concern”: courts must look to the
whole record and examine “content, form, and context” of that speech.274
Context includes “all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said,
where it was said, and how it was said.”275
Thus, even in a case involving content-based regulation, the Court in Snyder
required that courts look to how disruptive the speech is in its sociophysical
context. The Court appeared to incorporate what this Article has defined as
privacy into its inquiry as to whether the First Amendment can serve as a
defense to state tort law, even under heightened scrutiny.
4.

Situated Privacy and Persistence Over Time

Courts have been willing to recognize legitimate government interests in
regulating even political speech in public fora when that speech extensively
disrupts the ability of other people to enjoy a rivalrous physical space. I have
argued that recording can, in certain contexts, create precisely such a
disruption.
Thus far, however, I have limited the discussion to individually distinct
disruptive moments, in particular spaces. But places are not just physical—
they are socially constructed, and their nature is constructed along the axis of
time.276 A person calculating her social accessibility does not just rely on a
physical wall to maintain distance from another person. She also relies on the
way she spaces out interactions with that individual over time. You may call a
close friend every day or every week. You may call a less close friend, family
member, or professional colleague twice a year. This spacing out of the
relationship over time is part of your ongoing management of your relationship
with that person.

verdict at issue in this case. . . . [W]e have no occasion to consider how it might apply to
facts such as those before us, or whether it or similar regulations are constitutional.”).
273 Id. at 452.
274 Id. at 453 (emphasis added) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)).
275 Id. at 454 (emphases added).
276 See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY
OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 10-11 (2012); Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The
Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 443 (2006) (arguing that place is not
“simply given; place is, rather, constructed and given meaning as it becomes part of an
expressive culture”).
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Recording made over a longer period of time—that is, persistent
surveillance of an individual—disrupts privacy this way. Persistent and
targeted surveillance collapses individual moments of interaction, spread out
over time and mitigated through human forgetfulness, into one long story of an
individual’s life. The harms caused by persistent surveillance have been much
discussed in the Fourth Amendment literature, as courts have considered GPS
tracking by law enforcement.277 Persistent surveillance of an individual, even
in public, can lead to inferences about very private areas of that person’s life:
her religion, her addictions, her sexual predilections, her health.278 In the
Fourth Amendment context, judges and justices have recognized the need for
law to step in as technology lowers the costs of persistent surveillance.279
The interest in preventing persistent surveillance of an individual has been
less well articulated in the context of surveillance by private actors.
Nonetheless, some important points emerge. Just as persistent surveillance in
public over a long enough period of time can require a warrant under the
Fourth Amendment,280 persistent surveillance over a long enough period of
time can, in the private context, convert protectable newsgathering into
regulable action.
For example, a court ordered a paparazzo who persistently followed and
photographed Jackie Onassis and her family to stay away from them.281 Cases
addressing stalking laws characterize such persistent behavior as a combination
of speech and action, separating out the persistence and disruption as regulable

277 For one opinion in this discussion, see David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A
Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013) (exploring the prospects for and
advantages of mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment and arguing that its practical
challenges can be overcome through effective regulations). For a contrary opinion, see Orin
S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012)
(considering the implications of a mosaic theory and arguing that courts should reject the
theory because implementing it is difficult in light of rapid technological change).
278 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(arguing that GPS monitoring impinges on expectations of privacy because it “generates a
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of
detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”).
279 See id. at 956; Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011).
280 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that twenty-eight days of
GPS monitoring violates reasonable expectations of privacy); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (finding that
the use of a GPS to track an individual’s movement impairs a reasonable expectation of
privacy and is subject to Fourth Amendment protection).
281 Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (“When weighed against the de
minimis public importance of the daily activities of the defendant, Galella’s constant
surveillance, his obtrusive and intruding presence, was unwarranted and unreasonable.”).

216

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:167

harassment, rather than protectable speech.282 And in the captive audience
context, a listener is more likely to be treated as a captive audience if the
speaker persistently follows the listener.283
Individual targeting matters, too. Courts have found that even pure speech,
when aimed persistently at an individual rather than distributed to a mass
audience, can become more action-like in nature and thus may permissibly be
regulated. Persistent phone calls, which are clearly speech, can become
regulable harassment through their persistence when targeted at a particular
individual instead of made to the public at large.284
Thus, persistent surveillance of a specific individual over time may be
deemed by courts to be regulable action rather than protectable speech. Cases
suggest that both the persistent nature of the recording over time and the
individual targeting of it could convert a moment of protectable newsgathering
into speech entwined with unprotected action.
The great difficulty, of course, is line-drawing: When does following an
individual for purposes of gathering news about them become, instead,
regulable surveillance or harassment? Courts have identified the same linedrawing problem in the Fourth Amendment context: Following somebody in
public over twenty-eight days establishes a protectable privacy expectation,285
but who knows what the line is beyond that? What if the persistence is
disrupted—an individual follows and records somebody for fourteen days at a
time, followed by a three-day break, followed by fourteen days of recording?
What if that individual follows them for twenty-seven days instead of twentyeight? These are questions that will arise in future cases. The point is that,
despite a longstanding reluctance by courts to restrict recording in public

282 See Galella v. Onassis, 533 F. Supp. 1076, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“It does not strain
credulity or imagination to conceive of the systematic ‘public’ surveillance of another as
being the implementation of a plan to intrude on the privacy of another.” (citation omitted));
Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970) (“[U]nder certain
circumstances, surveillance may be so ‘overzealous’ as to render it actionable.”); see also
Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws,
and “Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. REV 731, 749 (2013) (finding that the First
Amendment does not apply “when someone approaches someone else too closely” or
“repeatedly follows someone even at a longer distance” because “[t]he law plausibly treats
all these sorts of speech as intruding onto a person physically, by using the person’s real or
personal property or coming too close to that person”).
283 Corbin, supra note 195, at 945; Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a
Right Not to Be Spoken to?, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 153, 194 (1972) (including in the definition
of “captivity” circumstances in which the target is being pursued by the communicator);
Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85,
114 (1991).
284 See Volokh, supra note 282, at 740.
285 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“We need not identify with
precision the point at which the tracking . . . became a search, for the line was surely crossed
before the 4-week mark.”).
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spaces,286 targeted recording over time is different, even if it takes place in
public.287
To reiterate the core theme of this Article: the scope of the protectable right
changes because the nature of the harm changes. One photograph of a person
in public may offend his dignity. Twenty-eight days of targeted tracking
meaningfully disrupts his environment and his behavior.288
5.

Situated Privacy and Trusted Spaces for Communication

Social bonds are features of the communications environment as much as
walls are or as time is. We rely on other people to keep our secrets. Trust
matters.289 We reveal more to people we trust than to people we do not.290 In
some contexts, social trust has not been protected by law.291. There is a
growing academic conversation about the importance of preserving trust in
communications and the relationship of trust to privacy.292

286 See, e.g., Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *6 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006).
287 But see Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the First Amendment Right to Gather News,
67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1097, 1127-28 (1999) (positing that mere chasing and following for
the purpose of information gathering without any physical harm or threat should not be
made the subject of liability).
288 But see Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 506-07, 51213, 513 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006) (holding that a woman who followed a town’s mayor, and whose
conduct may have satisfied the actus reus elements of criminal harassment, had a First
Amendment interest in her photographs as part of her political activism).
289 See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 13
(2010),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iptf_privacy_greenpaper_12162010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z97T-RS7T] (“Privacy protections are crucial to maintaining consumer
trust, which is necessary to secure full use of the Internet as a political, educational, cultural,
and social medium.”); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1207 (2016); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at
27), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2655719 [https://perma.cc/D76G-QQNY].
290
Valerian J. Derlega & Alan L. Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in Social
Relationships, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 102, 102-15 (1977).
291 For example, the Fourth Amendment does not protect people from disclosures by
“false friends.” See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971). But see Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991); Balkin, supra note 289, at 1199; Richards
& Hartzog, supra note 289, at 23-24 (“There is also substantial legal scholarship on the role
of the law in general in generating or discouraging trust.”).
292 See Balkin, supra note 289, at 1187 (recommending a shift in the focus of First
Amendment privacy protection to the relationships of trust and confidence); Richards &
Hartzog, supra note 289, at 2 (arguing that privacy rules can be used to enable trust in
essential information relationships).
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Courts have recognized that privacy can be not just in conflict with but
necessary for the First Amendment.293 Allowing individuals a legally
protected, safe space for the development of close relationships encourages
them to disclose more to trusted others in those safe spaces. If the boundaries
erected around a trusted conversation cannot be relied on, then individuals will
disclose less.
This raises a First Amendment concern, explicitly recognized by the
Supreme Court.294 If there are no privacy protections for certain modes of
communication, such as phone calls, then the First Amendment itself will
suffer, as people will say less on the phone. In other words, if technological
and environmental barriers fail to protect the privacy of individual
conversations, individuals will resort to behavioral changes, disclosing less.
There is a real First Amendment interest in preventing this chilling effect.295
The government interest in regulating the recording of conversations
contains, within itself, a First Amendment purpose. If eavesdropping or
wiretapping laws are challenged under the First Amendment, courts should
recognize that such laws also enable speech, not just prevent it. As the Seventh
Circuit explained in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, “[t]he protection of personal
conversational privacy serves First Amendment interests because ‘fear of
public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on
private speech.’”296 The First Amendment interest in encouraging free
expression often requires the protection of privacy.
IV. PRIVACY MEETS THE RIGHT TO RECORD
Privacy laws that govern recording have already been challenged under the
First Amendment. The question is: How should courts address such
challenges? This Article has thus far discussed the nature of the recording right
and the nature of the privacy interest at stake. This Part explains how the two
might meet.
First, I briefly discuss why regulations made in the name of safety or
property ownership, that nonetheless impact privacy, are inadequate to protect
privacy. Next, I answer the two difficult doctrinal questions posed in the
Introduction and in Part I: Why would the recording right change based on
location? And if the right to record is protected by the First Amendment, how
do we disaggregate the government’s interest in protecting privacy from an

293

See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532-33 (2001) (recognizing that the government
has an important interest in “encouraging the uninhibited exchanged of ideas and
information among private parties”).
295 See id. at 533; White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting); ACLU of Ill. v.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) (arguing that because
private talk in public places is common, nonconsensual recording will have an inhibiting
effect on the number and candor of conversations).
296 ACLU of Ill., 679 F.3d at 605 (quoting Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533).
294
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illegitimate interest in preventing speech? I close this Part with examples of
laws and cases, discussing whether courts have gotten it right, and what they
might do going forward.
A.

Why Nonprivacy Regulations Alone Are Inadequate

We need privacy laws. By this, I mean that we need laws that prevent
recording or information gathering in order to protect privacy. Relying solely
on laws that obliquely regulate recording by aiming at other purposes—such as
keeping the airways or streets safe, or governing the boundaries of private
property—will fail to adequately capture privacy interests and can leave
significant regulatory gaps.
For example, drones carry video cameras and other recording devices. The
FAA governs aircraft safety,297 and state law determines the extent of privately
owned airspace.298 Some scholars have suggested that we might rely on the
combination of FAA regulations and trespass law to prevent most anticipated
drone privacy problems and access to problematic airspace.299
It is possible, however, for a drone to fly in accordance with FAA
regulations, outside of privately owned airspace, and still commit a privacy
violation. I have referred to this as the “fifty-foot gap,” referencing California’s
recent attempt to ban drone flight under 350 feet, while the FAA suggests that
model aircraft hobbyists fly under 400 feet.300 In the fifty feet between an FAA

297 Mission,
FED.
AVIATION
ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/about/mission/
[https://perma.cc/35CW-2TEE] (last visited Nov. 20, 2016).
298 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Flight by
aircraft in the air space above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into
the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it interferes substantially
with the other’s use and enjoyment of his land.”); Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude
Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 191-93 (1990); Troy
A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158-59 (2015).
299 See GREGORY MCNEAL, BROOKINGS INST., DRONES AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEGISLATORS 4 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dronesand-aerial-surveillance-considerations-for-legislatures/
[https://perma.cc/6ZQK-4NEV]
(“Legislators should follow a property-rights approach to aerial surveillance. This approach
provides landowners with the right to exclude aircraft, persons, and other objects from a
column of airspace extending from the surface of their land up to 350 feet above ground
level. Such an approach may solve most public and private harms associated with drones.”);
Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 212.
300 See Justin Peters, California Governor Vetoes Bill to Stop Drones from Flying over
Private Property, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Sept. 10, 2015, 3:15 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/09/10/california_gov_jerry_brown_vetoes_bi
ll_to_stop_drones_from_flying_over_private.html
[https://perma.cc/Y7YX-SMC2]
(explaining the failure of the California bill that would have banned drone flight over private
property
below
350
feet);
Where
to
Fly,
FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/ [https://perma.cc/5WEC-GS4E] (last visited Oct. 14,
2016) (advising hobbyists to use drones within line of sight and under 400 feet); see also
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violation and trespass, drones would have been able to fly legally, record
individuals below, and evade enforcement under either legal regime. Some
states have attempted to regulate trespass onto privately owned airspace, rather
than regulating recording.301 Given the existence of zoom lenses, and the fact
that much information can be captured from an angle while not flying directly
overhead, these laws will not effectively prevent privacy violations. Oregon
recently amended its drone trespass law for precisely this reason.302
Finally, it is not clear that these laws will in fact avoid First Amendment
scrutiny. The Supreme Court in McCullen v. Coakley303 suggested that laws
that restrict access to public fora will undergo First Amendment scrutiny, even
if they do not explicitly mention speech.304 While it is unclear whether airspace
is a public forum (at least one scholar has argued that it is not),305 the Court’s
reasoning in McCullen should serve to caution regulators that clever workarounds will not necessarily avoid First Amendment scrutiny of laws designed
to prevent recording.
B.

Why the Doctrine Changes Depending on Physical Location

One of the biggest puzzles surrounding the right to record is why its scope
might differ in different physical locations. Numerous scholars have intuited
that this must be the case,306 and the case law has reflected the intuition that
location matters.307 None, however, has explained why location should affect
the scope of the recording right.
Currently, the scope of the right to record appears to vary depending on the
setting. In public fora, recording is protected; in private spaces, it might not be.
PublishPurdue, Drone Videos: Surveillance or Speech?, YOUTUBE (Oct. 11, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TOPWiIwkCso.
301 E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 837.380 (2015).
302 Id.
303 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
304 Id. at 2529 (“Thus, even though the Act says nothing about speech on its face, there is
no doubt . . . that it restricts access to traditional public fora and is therefore subject to First
Amendment scrutiny.”).
305 See, e.g., Blitz et al., supra note 2, at 123-24 (arguing that navigable airspace is a
limited purpose public forum).
306 Marc Blitz is one such scholar and proposed using forum doctrine. See id. at 110.
Others seem to have same intuition that the test will vary across physical spaces but do not
explain why. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 2, at 403; Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at
1034 (proposing a different test for recording on private property without consent than
recording in public or on private property with consent).
307 See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978) (noting that inmates
retain a fundamental right to privacy that is not overcome by the First Amendment rights to
film and photograph of either the public or media); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583,
595 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that the First
Amendment protects the filming of government officials engaged in their duties in public
spaces).
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This variation, I believe, is appropriate. First Amendment salience—what
counts as speech, or is visible to First Amendment analysis—can be
understood as itself internalizing balancing between speech and other
values.308 The default balance will differ in a public versus a private space.
Salience can reflect this changed default as much as scrutiny.
The scope of the right to record sets a default balance between speech and
privacy based on assumptions about particular kinds of spaces. In public, all
recordings may be First Amendment salient (with the exception, perhaps, of
the persistent and individually targeted surveillance discussed above). But in
private, only some recordings might merit First Amendment scrutiny. This
difference in salience shows First Amendment doctrine internalizing the
expected nature of harms that may occur in different kinds of locations.
Lest this idea that the scope of First Amendment protection varies based on
location be shocking—after all, the Internet and books are protected
everywhere309—let us return to earlier examples. A newsgatherer presumably,
like all individuals, has a First Amendment right to access a public forum. But
a newsgatherer has a much more limited First Amendment right to access
courts310 and has no First Amendment right to access prisons.311 It is not that
the newsgatherer has a First Amendment right in each of these three settings
that is scrutinized differently against different government interests; it is that
the access right itself differs in scope. Access is less salient to the First
Amendment when it involves more private spaces.
Forum doctrine itself can be understood as supporting this idea: First
Amendment protection often varies depending on the nature of the physical
place in which the speech act occurs. First Amendment analysis differs greatly
depending on whether the regulation is of a public forum, or a limited purpose
public forum, such as a school, or a place of public employment.312 On the
high seas, for example, the First Amendment is not solicitous of Greenpeace
protests; in a public forum, it clearly would be.313

308 Fred Schauer has extensively described the notion of salience. Schauer, supra note
38, at 1768 (defining constitutional salience as “the often mysterious political, social,
cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical, and economic forces that influence which
policy questions surface as constitutional issues and which do not”).
309 See Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1013.
310 See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
311 See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
312 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 n.2 (2014) (“A different analysis would
of course be required if the government property at issue were not a traditional public forum
but instead ‘a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the
discussion of certain subjects.’” (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
470 (2009))).
313 Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Greenpeace USA has no audience at sea. And although the injunction imposes a safety
‘bubble’ around Shell’s vessels, Greenpeace USA’s reliance on Schenck and its discussion
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In a public forum, recording of all kinds (again, perhaps excepting persistent
surveillance) should be First Amendment salient. Thus, courts are wrong to
limit the scope of the right to record in public fora; speech rights in public fora
are historically broad, and subject to greater protection—“time out of mind.”314
That is not to say that privacy regulations targeting a public forum will be
subject to strict scrutiny. But recordings made in a public forum will likely
always be First Amendment salient, and regulation of them will be subject to
some form of First Amendment analysis.
However, this is not true of nonpublic fora, or privately owned locations.315
There, as with newsgathering, the scope of the right will be more limited or
even nonexistent. For example, as long as Estes and Houchins are good law,
there is no First Amendment right to record a trial or in a prison. If there is no
First Amendment right to record in a prison, a government-run institution, that
begs the question of whether there is ever such a right to record on private
property.
One can envision courts creating a modified version of access law for
private property, asking whether a recording right exists in a particular space
based on balancing the recording’s public benefit against how disruptive the
recording will be to ordinary functioning within that environment.316 This is
effectively the question posed by access law; it is also the question posed when
evaluating whether a public employee may speak about the government his
employer.317 A public employee may speak about what happens in his place of
employment only if his interest in commenting on matters of public concern
outweighs his employer’s interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs.”318 In other words, a public employee’s speech is salient
to the First Amendment only when its significance outweighs an employer’s
interest in maintaining an undisrupted work environment. Otherwise, even

of bubble zones around abortion clinics is sorely misplaced. Speech is, of course, most
protected in such quintessential public fora as the public sidewalks surrounding abortion
clinics. . . . But the high seas are not a public forum, and the lessons of Schenck have little
applicability there.” (citations omitted)).
314 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (recognizing greater protections for
“traditional public fora that ‘time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions’” (quoting
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939))).
315 Timothy Zick has suggested that the binary demarcation of public and private fora is
inadequately representative of the “expressive topography” of physical space. Zick, supra
note 276, at 439. I agree. However, as courts still use this binary distinction, and as Zick’s
own policy recommendations suggest no change to the underlying binary, I continue to use
the binary of public and private fora in this Article.
316 Marceau & Chen, supra note 2, at 1007.
317 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam); Helen Norton,
Government Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 75, 80 (2008).
318 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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though it is technically speech, it is not speech for purposes of First
Amendment analysis.319
Both access law and public employee speech law provide examples for how
in certain nonpublic spaces, a more limited recording right may exist. It will be
narrower in scope, and it will be determined by balancing values at the stage of
determining whether the right exists at all. Not all recording will be First
Amendment salient in private spaces; the burden will be on the recorder to
argue that recording is protected as speech in that context.
This difference—that all recording may be protected in public spaces but
only some may be protected in nonpublic spaces—is understandable only if
one can articulate both the nature of the speech right and the nature of the
anticipated harm. A person in a private location historically has had more tools
at her disposal for managing social accessibility: walls, windows, window
curtains, distance, rooms, and social norms for behavior in private spaces. A
person in a public location may still desire to manage her social accessibility,
and thus may still have a privacy interest, but her tools in that setting are fewer
and less effective. Combined with traditional First Amendment respect for
public fora, this suggests that the speech interest in public fora is stronger,
while the privacy harm is usually lower.
This is not to say that the old privacy binary, where we protect privacy in
private spaces but not in public spaces, is correct. Rather, the division of public
fora and nonpublic spaces at the salience stage serves to set defaults, not drive
foregone conclusions. Speech receives a stronger thumb on the scale in public
settings, where recording “is speech” or is salient regardless of its subject
matter. And the framework puts a heavy thumb on the privacy side when the
setting is not a public forum and asks for balancing of privacy with the value of
the speech at issue.
Privacy interests, as described in this Article, are built into First Amendment
access analysis. The right to record doctrine will, and to a large extent should,
reflect these default salience settings, even as recording becomes more
culturally acceptable and pervasive, because those defaults reflect the nature of
particular sociophysical spaces.
C.

How Privacy Can Be Separated from Speech

The second difficult doctrinal problem created by the right to record is how
to separate the government interest in protecting privacy from an
impermissible interest in regulating speech. When is an interest in regulating
recording “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” under O’Brien, or
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech” under the
time, place, and manner test?320
319

See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
320
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To address this question, privacy must be understood as it has been
articulated in this Article: as the ability to manage social accessibility within a
physical and temporal environment. Once the nature of privacy regulation has
been understood in this way—as closely analogous to regulations of sound
trucks and loud rock bands—courts can justifiably assess privacy under an
O’Brien analysis, or time, place, and manner analysis, as they appear wont to
do.321 As the Supreme Court has explained, while “regulation of
communications due to the ideas expressed . . . ‘strikes at the core of First
Amendment values[,] . . . regulations of form and context may strike a
constitutionally appropriate balance between the advocate’s right to convey a
message and the recipient’s interest in the quality of his environment.’”322
I here address four questions raised in practice by the interface between
privacy protections and a right to record. First, I discuss the strength of the
government interest: How strong of an interest in privacy is strong enough to
withstand scrutiny? Second, when is a recording law content neutral, versus
content based? A content-based law will undergo strict scrutiny; a contentneutral law can instead undergo an O’Brien analysis or time, place, and
manner analysis. Third, when is a law adequately tailored? I have argued that
the government interest in protecting privacy can, even in public, be an
important government interest; but in a public forum, what constitutes narrow
tailoring of a law to that interest? Can a complete ban on recording in a
particular space ever be narrowly tailored? And fourth, how should courts
address the often-employed notice and consent requirements in recording
laws? Are these a form of prior restraint?323 Or can they be constitutional?
1.

The Government Interest

The government interest in governing recording is, as discussed above and
at length in Part III, an interest in managing the qualities of physical space so
as not to allow one person’s behavior to disrupt the behavior of others such
that changed behavior results in significant social costs. That interest will not
always be strong enough to justify suppression of recording, but it is distinct
from an interest in suppressing speech. Regulating recording governs a
moment of interaction in physical space, not a downstream editorial decision

321

See, e.g., ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 607 (7th Cir. 2012) (performing
analysis under the time, place, and manner standard, but not deciding whether it applies);
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011).
322 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 83-84 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)).
323 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
169 (2002) (holding that a requirement to register before public speaking is incompatible
with the requirements of the First Amendment).
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based on dignitary harms. It, thus, does not break with the long tradition in the
United States of protecting the publication and distribution of information.324
There are two basic approaches to protecting privacy from recording in this
context. One approach entails banning recording entirely in a particular space
or context to prevent socially harmful behavioral disruptions. The other
involves the less drastic requirement of notice or consent, so the individual
being recorded does not unintentionally overexpose herself to others.
When might that government interest be strong enough to overcome speech
interests? First Amendment case law recognizes a legitimate government
interest in protecting particular places from meaningful disruptions, such as the
home, sidewalks outside the home, the area outside an embassy, and public
sidewalks outside polling places on election day.325 Lower courts have also
recognized an interest in protecting welfare offices, churches, and funerals.326
This is not to say that privacy will overcome a right to record in precisely those
same places, but to show both that in those places, the Court has been
solicitous of privacy-related arguments, and that, in general, the Court has
found strong enough privacy interests outside the home to overcome speech
concerns.
First Amendment case law also recognizes a legitimate government interest
in empowering an individual to make choices about exposing herself to
disruptive influences. This interest has been recognized in particular settings
and contexts, by imposing a consent requirement for certain kinds of behavior,
such as receiving unwanted mail at home or restricting petitioners from
approaching within eight feet of a person outside a healthcare facility.327
These cases establish that the government interest in preventing recording in
some contexts, and requiring notice or consent in others, can be a legitimate
interest. The extent to which a ban on an activity can be considered adequately
tailored is discussed further below.
2.

Content Neutrality

Establishing a legitimate government interest is far from the end of the
question. A content-based law, even in a public forum, will undergo strict

324 See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 496-97 (1975).
325 See supra Section II.B.
326 E.g., Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2004);
Edwards v. City of Santa Barbara, 150 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1998); Phelps-Roper v.
Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 619 (N.D. Ohio 2007); see also Corbin, supra note 195, at 94950.
327 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000) (holding that eight-foot buffer zone
around healthcare facility was “a valid time, place, and manner regulation”); Rowan v. U.S.
Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (“[T]he mailer’s right to communicate is
circumscribed only by an affirmative act of the addressee giving notice that he wishes no
further mailings from that mailer.”).
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scrutiny.328 A content-neutral law, by contrast, undergoes the more permissive
time, place, and manner test.329 Regulating recording can raise two kinds of
questions around content neutrality. First, if the government is regulating
recording to prevent disruptions to the behavior of the person being recorded,
does that make the regulation content based? Second, is regulating recording of
a particular location content based or content neutral?
The Supreme Court has articulated a number of tests for content neutrality.
In Hill, the Court described the content-based/content-neutral distinction as
hinging on “whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”330 That test, however,
may conflate content-based regulation with the even more suspect viewpointbased regulation. In McCullen, the Court found a law creating a fixed buffer
zone around abortion clinics to be content neutral because its enactment could
be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”331 The
law would not have been content neutral “if it were concerned with undesirable
effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or
‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.’”332
This test for content neutrality—whether the government is trying to protect
listeners from speech because of their reactions to that speech—presents a
potential hurdle for regulating recording. Regulating recording clearly protects
the subject of recording from her reaction to that recording. In fact, as
articulated at length in this Article, that is often the government interest: to
allow the subject of a recording to avoid having to react to it. If one analogizes
directly from the unwilling listener cases, then a government desire to protect
the subject of “speech” from an adverse reaction to it seems to turn the
regulation into a content-based regulation.
This analogy to the unwilling listener cases is incorrect. The listener of a
recording and the subject of a recording are distinct.333 Unlike the unwilling
listener cases, where the person being protected from confrontation in a
physical space is also the unwilling listener to the content of that speech, the
target audience for most recordings is not the person being protected from
confrontation in the physical space. It is, thus, possible to disaggregate a
government interest in preventing undesirable behavioral shifts on the part of

328 Hill, 530 U.S. at 735 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[C]ontent-based discriminations are
subject to strict scrutiny because they place the weight of government behind the
disparagement or suppression of some messages . . . .”).
329 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
330 Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
331 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (quoting City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
332 Id. at 2531-32 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (alteration in
original)).
333 But see Simonson, supra note 66, at 1575-76 (claiming that filming police is in fact
expressive to police officers in the moment the recording occurs).
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the person being recorded at the instance of recording, from a government
interest in the impact of the circulation of that recording on a later audience.
The latter motive would be impermissibly content focused; the former would
be as content neutral as regulations of sound trucks or loud bands.
The Court in Snyder articulated this same distinction.334 In distinguishing
content-based regulation from potentially content-neutral buffer-zone
regulation, the Court contrasted regulation based on content and viewpoint
with regulation targeting the disruptiveness of behavior at the moment of
interaction in a physical environment.335 The government interest in preventing
the disruption of the funeral service in a physical space was a content-neutral
interest; the government interest in preventing a reaction to “the message
conveyed” was content based, or even viewpoint based.
Regulating recording because of its behavioral impact on the person being
recorded at the moment of recording, therefore, does not necessarily make the
regulation content based. What about regulating particular spaces? A number
of recording laws protect specific physical locations.336 If these laws are
deemed content based, they will undergo strict scrutiny.337 If they are deemed
content neutral, they will undergo some form of intermediate scrutiny.338
The buffer-zone cases focus on the regulation of particular named spaces. In
Hill, the Court deemed the scrutinized law, which regulated counseling outside
of health care facilities, to be content neutral for three reasons.339 First, the law
did not regulate speech itself, but instead regulated “the places where some
speech may occur.”340 Second, the law “was not adopted because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.”341 And third, and importantly, the

334

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).
Id. at 457.
336 For example, California attempted to ban drone flights over schools, wildfires,
prisons, and jails, but the governor eventually vetoed these bills. Patrick McGreevy, With
Strong Message Against Creating New Crimes, Gov. Brown Vetoes Drone Bills, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 3, 2015, 3:24 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-me-pc-gov-brown-vetoes-billsrestricting-hobbyist-drones-at-fires-schools-prisons-20151003-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5QUU-NY7N]. Idaho protects farms, ranches, and dairies from drone
surveillance. IDAHO CODE § 21-213(2)(a)(ii) (2009 & Supp. 2016). Illinois Tennessee both
protect hunters from drone surveillance, targeting the filming of particular classes of people
doing particular activities, rather than particular spaces. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/483(b)(10) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-302(6) (2012 & Supp. 2015). This approach
likely poses more serious content-based problems. Of course, one great difficulty is drawing
the line between laws aimed at speech, and laws protecting a privacy interest triggered by
the nature of a particular location.
337 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 (1992).
338 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000).
339 Id. at 719.
340 Id.
341 Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
335
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State’s interests in protecting patient access and privacy were unrelated to the
content of the protestors’ speech.342
The Court in Hill explicitly rejected the idea that focusing regulation on a
specific location makes the regulation content based.343 Similarly, the Court in
Boos found that a regulation targeting congregating outside a foreign embassy
was content neutral.344 A state could thus protect particular locations from
recording without always triggering strict scrutiny. In McCullen, the Court
again took up the question of content neutrality.345 The majority conceded that
the law, which created a fixed buffer zone of thirty-five feet outside of a
reproductive healthcare facility, would inevitably restrict abortion-related
speech more than other kinds of speech.346 The majority concluded, however,
that “a facially neutral law does not become content based simply because it
may disproportionately affect speech on certain topics.”347
On the other hand, targeting a particular speaker or particular subject matter
will invoke strict scrutiny.348 When a law “does not simply have an effect on
speech, but is directed at certain content and is aimed at particular speakers,” it
is content based rather than content neutral.349 Courts will need to disentangle,
on the one hand, the idea that regulating a particular physical space does not
automatically regulate particular content, from the idea that regulating a
particular subject matter makes a law content based. This will likely involve
looking to government motive; again, “‘content-neutral’ speech regulations”
are “those that are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.”350
Last, there is the question of how courts should address exceptions or
carveouts. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., a recent case addressing Vermont’s
regulation of prescription information and data mining, the Supreme Court
found the law to be content based and not tailored to a legitimate government
interest in part because of exceptions to the law’s coverage.351 And in the
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Id. at 719-20.
Id. at 724.
344 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988) (noting that the Congregation Clause
withstood First Amendment scrutiny because “[i]t [did] not reach a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected conduct”).
345 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014).
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
349 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567.
350 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986); see also Sorrell,
564 U.S. at 566.
351 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d)-(e) (2015) (creating exemptions to general
prohibition of use of regulated records containing prescriber-identifiable information for
various uses); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 572-73 (“Under Vermont’s law, pharmacies may share
343
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recent case Reed v. Town of Gilbert,352 the Court found that an Arizona town
code that named and regulated twenty-three different kinds of signs was
impermissibly content based.353
The Court appears to look at the connection between a legitimate, neutral
state interest and the State’s decision to carve out exceptions. In Carey v.
Brown,354 the Court invalidated Illinois’s ban on nonlabor picketing because
the distinction between labor and nonlabor picketing could not be “justified by
reference to the State’s interest in maintaining domestic tranquility.”355 The
Court in Carey found the regulation to be content based because of its
carveouts for labor picketing.356 In McCullen, on the other hand, exemptions
for particular individuals, like clinic employees, did not make the law content
based, in large part because the exemptions were tied to the functioning of the
abortion clinic.357 After the Court’s recent decision in Reed, this is an area that
will likely be open to further litigation.
3.

Tailoring

Determining whether a law is content based or content neutral is still not the
end of the analysis. Even when the more permissive time, place, and manner
analysis or O’Brien analysis is applied, a law still must be tailored. To be
narrowly tailored under time, place, and manner analysis, a law must not
burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s
legitimate interests.358 Unlike strict scrutiny, the means employed need not be
the least restrictive or least intrusive means.359 There must, however, be ample
alternative means of communication available.360 This calls into question
whether a complete ban on recording could ever be constitutional.

prescriber-identifying information with anyone for any reason save one: They must not
allow the information to be used for marketing. Exceptions further allow pharmacies to sell
prescriber-identifying information for certain purposes, including ‘health care research.’
And the measure permits insurers, researchers, journalists, the State itself, and others to use
the information.” (citation omitted)).
352 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
353 Id. at 2228 (“The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given sign thus
depend entirely on he communicative content of the sign . . . . On its face, the Sign Code is a
content-based regulation of speech.”).
354 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
355 Id. at 465.
356 See id. at 464-65.
357 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2533 (2014).
358 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
359 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2535 (“Such a regulation, unlike a content-based restriction
of speech, ‘need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the
government’s interests.” (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799)).
360 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
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In McCullen, the Court found that the fixed buffer zone around abortion
clinics was not narrowly tailored under time, place, and manner analysis.361
While the fixed buffer zone clearly served legitimate government interests in
ensuing public safety, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and
sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to
seek pregnancy-related services,362 the law took the “extreme step of closing a
substantial portion of a traditional public forum to all speakers.”363
This holding suggests that while a recording law aimed at a particular space
can be deemed content neutral, it could face a tailoring challenge if it bans all
recording in that space. Recording laws targeted at protecting a particular
genre of behavior that occurs in a particular space—say, outside a school or
hospital—might be deemed to be too broad in scope.
Two factors mitigate this concern, however. First, McCullen addressed First
Amendment protections for classic forms of expression: leafletting and one-toone communications, “the essence of First Amendment expression.”364 While
courts should not be biased towards protecting particular modes of
communication over others, the Court in McCullen was clearly concerned with
tailoring because the regulation foreclosed historically protected
communications in a public forum. Recording is not a classic form of
expression.
Second, the Court has in fact allowed foreclosure of an entire mode of
communication in a particular location: picketing, in a public forum, in front of
a house.365 In Frisby, the Court explained that a “complete ban can be narrowly
tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an
appropriately targeted evil.”366 “[T]he ‘evil’ of targeted residential picketing,
‘the very presence of an unwelcome visitor at the home’ . . . ‘is created by the
medium of expression itself.’”367 Hence, the Court in Frisby found a complete
ban on picketing targeted at the home to be narrowly tailored.368 If recording as
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McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537.
Id. at 2537-39.
363 Id. at 2541. The Court explained that the fixed buffer zone upheld in Burson v.
Freeman around polling places on election day was, by contrast, appropriately tailored to
prevent voter intimidation because voter intimidation is more difficult to detect than
abortion protesters. Id. at 2540.
364 Id. at 2536 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995));
see also Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997) (“Leafletting
and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart
of the First Amendment . . . .”).
365 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1988).
366 Id. at 485.
367 Id. at 487 (first quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); and then quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
810 (1984)).
368 Id. at 488.
362
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a medium is deemed to be sufficiently disruptive of a particular environment—
as in Estes or Burson—then a content-neutral law banning all recording in a
particular space may nonetheless survive a tailoring challenge.369
Tailoring is related to the strength of the government interest. Where the
government interest is not well articulated or sufficiently strong, a tailoring
challenge is more likely to be successful. Where, however, the government
interest convincingly identifies a particular evil that cannot be mitigated except
by a complete ban, courts may find even a complete ban to be narrowly
tailored.370
4.

Consent of the Unwilling Subject

Many states include a consent requirement, a notice requirement, or both in
their eavesdropping laws.371 Those requirements enable a surveillance subject
to adjust her behavior by putting her on notice, and thereby accurately manage
her social accessibility. There is a significant question of whether or when such
a requirement might be constitutional.
A long line of First Amendment cases shows skepticism toward regulatory
burdens on speech. The Supreme Court has rejected registration requirements
for pamphleteering and door-to-door advocacy, citing a First Amendment right
to anonymous speech.372 Registration requirements discourage impromptu
speech, operating as a form of prior restraint.373 Similarly, the Court recently
deemed unconstitutional a consent requirement for distribution of prescriber
information, reasoning that “[l]awmakers may no more silence unwanted
speech by burdening its utterance than by censoring its content.”374 In Sorrell,
the Court explained in its rejection of consent requirements that the
“distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter

369 But see City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (noting that the Court has
been particularly skeptical of “laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression”).
370 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).
371 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing various state eavesdropping
laws with explicit or implicit notice or consent requirements).
372 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
164 (2002) (holding that registration requirement for canvassing and pamphleteering was
unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment because of the “breadth of speech
affected . . . and the nature of the regulation”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that requiring pamphleteers to identify themselves was
unconstitutional, because “[u]nder our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent”).
373 See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 164.
374 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011).
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of degree.”375 However, the Court’s holding in Sorrell may be limited in its
application, as it addressed only content-based regulation.376
By contrast, in the buffer-zone cases, the Supreme Court has three times
rejected First Amendment challenges to a consent requirement and upheld
consent requirements as constitutional.377 The Court’s reasoning in Hill was
twofold: First, concerns about prior restraints generally relate to “restrictions
imposed by official censorship,” not restrictions imposed by private citizens.378
Second, the consent requirement is merely an attempt to empower private
citizens to do what they already do: retain “the power to decide for themselves
what they wish to read, and within limits, what oral messages they want to
consider.”379
The Court characterized the consent requirement as protecting an autonomy
interest on the part of the unwilling listener.380 It enables the listener to make
his or her own decisions about disruptive or confrontational speech, rather than
imposing an official view of whether such speech should be tolerated. In the
recording context, the buffer-zone cases suggest that one-party consent
requirements are likely to survive scrutiny.
D.

The Tests Applied: Examples

The right to record will be different in different kinds of spaces. In a public
forum, courts should acknowledge that the right to record exists, regardless of
whether the subject of the recording is a matter of public concern. This departs
from the suggestions in current case law, but it is consistent with how speech is
usually treated in a public forum. In a public forum, the recording law will then
undergo time, place, and manner analysis rather than strict scrutiny, unless the
law is content based. If the law is content based it will undergo strict scrutiny.
In a nonpublic setting, I propose that the right to record should not exist
unless the subject of the recording is a matter of public concern that trumps the
interests of the recorded individual in managing her environment. This is
consistent with how courts have treated governmentally owned nonpublic
spaces, under both access case law and case law on the speech rights of
government employees. Courts should consider extending some protection of
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Id. at 565-66 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812
(2000)).
376 See id. at 566 (citing Playboy, 529 U.S. at 812).
377 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (2014) (noting similarity between
consent requirement in the challenged law and the buffer-zone law held constitutional in
Hill); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734-35 (2000) (holding that consent requirement for
buffer-zone outside health-care facility was constitutional); cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S.
191, 211 (1992) (upholding the constitutionality of a campaign-free zone around polling
places).
378 Hill, 530 U.S. at 734.
379 Id.
380 See id.
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recording into privately owned spaces, but these decisions will and should be
highly context specific.
Below, I discuss several examples of these tests applied to existing laws.
Importantly, I do not claim to have discovered the ideal parameters for crafting
a privacy law that will survive First Amendment scrutiny. Regulatory
experimentation with balancing privacy interests and speech interests is still
desirable.381 The below examples should, however, guide courts when they
encounter these laws.
1.

Recording in Public Locations

The government interest in protecting privacy will be consistently lower in
public locations. That is not to say that it will be nonexistent. I assess three
versions of laws governing recording in public fora to show when the
government interest might be strong enough to survive scrutiny under the time,
place, and manner or O’Brien test—and when it might not.
a.

The Illinois Eavesdropping Statute

The Illinois eavesdropping statute at issue in ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez382
was unusually broad in scope.383 Unlike most eavesdropping and wiretapping
laws, the Illinois statute had no requirement that the parties to a protected
conversation actually have an expectation of privacy.384 It required two-party
consent to allow recording, and while a party’s consent could be inferred,
express disapproval would defeat that inference.385 The Illinois eavesdropping
law could be applied to open recording of conversations conducted in public,
where the parties to the conversation had no expectation of privacy at all.386
The Seventh Circuit, considering a pre-enforcement action for declaratory
and injunctive relief, found that the Illinois eavesdropping statute was likely
unconstitutional as applied to audio recording of police officers conducting
their duties in public places.387 Thus, the Court enjoined full enforcement of
the statute. Although the Seventh Circuit did not determine the proper level of
scrutiny, it applied intermediate scrutiny to the statute and found that it would
likely fail because of the lack of a reasonably close fit between law’s means
and its ends.388

381 See Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They
Carry, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57, 57-59 (2013).
382 679 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2012).
383 See id. at 595.
384 Id.
385 Id. at 587.
386 See id.
387 Id. at 608.
388 Id. at 604-06.
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I largely agree with the Seventh Circuit’s approach. Even applying the more
nuanced understanding of privacy detailed in this Article, the Illinois
legislature failed to adequately state a government interest in governing
conversations held in public by public officials conducting public duties, and
the legislature failed to tailor the statute to legitimate privacy concerns. The
government may have a legitimate interest in protecting conversational
privacy, but by eliminating the requirement that conversations actually be
private, instead protecting against all non-consensual recordings, the Illinois
legislature “severed the link between the eavesdropping statute’s means and its
end.”389
Moreover, the statute at the time applied even to open, non-surreptitious
recording, further indicating the weakness of the stated government interest in
protecting privacy.390 The Illinois legislature, in other words, was not
protecting an interest in providing notice to the subjects of recording so they
could adjust their behavior—an interest that the Seventh Circuit recognized
would have been “stronger.”391 Nor was the government protecting an interest
in preventing undesirable shifts in behavior, because it could not articulate how
a shift in public officials’ behavior would be undesirable.392
Significantly, the Seventh Circuit found that the eavesdropping law was
content neutral on its face.393 Even though an interest in protecting privacy is
grounded in the reactions of those whose privacy is violated, the court
explained that the law did not target any particular message, speaker, or idea; a
law does not become content based merely because law enforcement must look
at content to determine whether the law applies.394 It was only when addressing
the law’s exemption for media that the court considered a possible contentbased discrimination.395 This approach is consistent with the distinctions
between content-based and content-neutral laws discussed above: a law is
content neutral when it addresses privacy generally, but content based when it
governs speech based on a listener’s anticipated reaction or perhaps when it
names a particular class of speech or speakers.
Thus, while the Illinois eavesdropping law raised significant First
Amendment concerns and would likely fail intermediate scrutiny, a typical
eavesdropping law—protecting private conversations from surreptitious
recording, obviated with one-party consent—likely would not. If the
government could point to a legitimate interest in protecting conversational
privacy, coupled with a consent exception, or a focus on surreptitious rather
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Id. at 606.
Id. at 607.
391 Id. at 607 n.13.
392 See id. at 586.
393 Id. at 603 (finding that the statute “does not target any particular message, idea, or
subject matter”).
394 Id.
395 Id. at 604.
390
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than open recordings, a typical eavesdropping law would likely not face the
same problems as the Illinois law. Most eavesdropping and wiretapping laws
in the United States include one or more of these elements.396
b.

The Wisconsin Drone Law

In 2013, Wisconsin enacted a statute to protect its citizens from privacy
violations committed by people operating drones. The statute makes it a
misdemeanor to use a drone “to photograph, record, or otherwise observe
another individual in a place or location where the individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.”397 The statute does not define a “reasonable
expectation of privacy,” nor does it indicate that the “place or location” need
be in seclusion or privately owned. Wisconsin courts have previously
interpreted the phrase “a reasonable expectation of privacy” in Wisconsin’s
video voyeurism statute to apply beyond locations where a person is actually in
seclusion.398 I, thus, analyze the Wisconsin law expecting that it may be
applied in public locations.
In contrast with the Illinois eavesdropping law, which does not require any
expectation of privacy, the Wisconsin drone law protects a relatively strong
government interest, actively defined by courts.399 The Wisconsin legislature’s
use of the phrase “a reasonable expectation of privacy” delegates the extent of
the state interest to courts.400 Presumably, courts will be aware of the First
Amendment implications and may throw out cases that implicate First
Amendment interests on the grounds that there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy.
This is not to say that using the phrase “a reasonable expectation of privacy”
always insulates a recording law from First Amendment scrutiny. The phrase
might be considered impermissibly vague, although a previous Wisconsin

396

See Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording
Police Conduct, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 283-86 (2012); Travis S. Triano, Note, Who
Watches the Watchmen? Big Brother’s Use of Wiretap Statutes to Place Civilians in
Timeout, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 389, 394-95 (2012) (identifying the Illinois and
Massachusetts eavesdropping laws as “the strictest in the nation”).
397 WIS. STAT. § 942.10 (2016).
398 State v. Jahnke, 2009 WI App 4, ¶ 9, 316 Wis. 2d 324, 762 N.W.2d 696, 699.
399 Compare WIS. STAT. § 942.10 (2016), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (2012).
400 The Wisconsin legislature has done the same in the context of its video voyeurism
law. See WIS. STAT. § 942.09 (2016) (documenting the Wisconsin video voyeurism law).
Wisconsin courts have interpreted “reasonable expectation of privacy” in that context to (1)
depart from Fourth Amendment standards, and (2) include expectations of privacy
specifically against recording—even when a person has permission to be in a particular
location. See Jahnke, 2009 WI App 4, ¶ 9, 762 N.W.2d at 699; State v. Nelson, 2006 WI
App 124, ¶ 21, 294 Wis. 2d 578, 718 N.W.2d 168, 174-75 (finding that the phrase
“reasonable expectation of privacy” departs from the Fourth Amendment interpretation).

236

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:167

court decision suggests that it is not.401 The law might face a tailoring
challenge: Courts might find that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists
even in locations where the First Amendment should trump any interests in
privacy. Or, perhaps, the lack of a consent-based exception shows inadequate
tailoring. If Wisconsin is interested in enabling individuals to manage their
social accessibility, they ought to be able to consent to recording where
desired. And if, instead, Wisconsin is interested in preserving particular
behavior by outright banning recording by drone, the statute could be more
carefully tailored to protect privacy in particular locations or scenarios.
Of course, any kind of tailoring raises the problem of potentially making the
law content-based. The Wisconsin law is content neutral on its face: it targets a
technology that creates a heightened government interest in protecting privacy,
not particular speakers. This is in stark contrast with a Texas drone law, which
contains carveouts galore, including for a “Texas licensed real estate broker in
connection with the marketing . . . of real property,” and for “the owner or
operator of an oil, gas, water, or other pipeline for the purpose of
inspecting . . . pipelines.”402 Texas singles out particular speakers—not just
drone operators, but speakers and specific content—for different treatments.
The Texas law is likely content based under Reed and, thus, might be subjected
to strict scrutiny.403 The Wisconsin law is not.
c.

The Arkansas Automatic License Plate Reader Law

ALPRs track an individual’s location over time by taking photographs of
cars’ license plates, correlating the images with GPS data, and making them
machine-readable so they can be easily analyzed by computer.404 Arkansas and
Utah have both enacted laws prohibiting private use of this technology.405
ALPR companies sued Utah for violating their First Amendment rights.406 In
reaction, Utah heavily amended the law, crafting an exception that allows
private entities to collect license plate information and sell it to third parties.407
Arkansas was also sued for First Amendment violations after prohibiting the
use of ALPRs.408 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confirmed
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See Nelson, 2006 WI App, ¶ 54, 718 N.W.2d at 183.
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 423.002(13), (17) (West 2016); see also id. § 423.003.
403 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015).
404 Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Cars—DEA Uses License-Plate Readers to
Build Database for Federal, Local Authorities, WALL STREET J., Jan. 27, 2015, at A1.
405 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-1801 through -1808 (2013 & Supp. 2016); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 41-6a-2001 through 2006 (LexisNexis 2016).
406 See, e.g., Complaint at 12-14, Dig. Recognition Network, Inc. v. Herbert, (No. 2:14cv-00099-CW) (D. Utah Feb. 13, 2014).
407 Automatic License Plate Reader System Amendments, ch. 276, 2014 Utah Laws
1158-59 (limiting the prohibition on warrantless use of ALPRs to governmental entities).
408 See Dig. Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchison, 803 F.3d 952, 954 (8th Cir. 2015).
402
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dismissal of the case on standing grounds, nonetheless assuming an injury-infact “arguably affected with a constitutional interest.”409
Beginning in 2013, the Arkansas Automatic License Plate Reader Systems
Act makes it “unlawful for an individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or the State of Arkansas, its agencies, and political subdivisions to use an
automatic license plate reader system.”410 The Act defines an ALPR as “a
system of one . . . or more mobile or fixed automated high-speed cameras used
in combination with computer algorithms to convert images of license plates
into computer-readable data.”411 By itself, this language looks problematic.
The Act bans the use of a camera, in combination with algorithms, to convert
visual information into computer-readable information. Thus, it should trigger
First Amendment scrutiny.
The government interest, however, is clearly in protecting citizen privacy
from persistent location tracking over time. This, as discussed at length above,
is a legitimate government interest, distinct from an interest in targeting
speech.412 It might even, as discussed above, convert the recording at issue
from newsgathering into regulable action, like stalking. This interest in privacy
is indicated within the Act. The Act defines “[c]aptured plate data” as “the
global positioning device coordinates, date and time, photograph, license plate
number, and any other data captured by or derived from any automatic license
plate reader system.”413 Read in conjunction with this definition, the Act’s ban
on ALPRs is intended as a ban on persistent location tracking over time.
The law may face a tailoring challenge in the future, depending on what
“other data” is captured by ALPR systems. The government interest in
protecting the particular kind of privacy implicated by this particular
technology is, however, strong.
The Act is also largely content neutral, in that it targets license-plate-related
data, not because of the effect that location information may have on a
downstream audience, but because collection of that information by ALPRs is
intrinsically related to location tracking. The Act contains, however, several
exemptions: one for law enforcement use; one for parking enforcement; and
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Id. at 957-58 (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979)) (finding that while plaintiffs could be assumed to have alleged injury-in-fact, they
had not shown it to be “fairly traceable” to either official sued because the Act is to be
enforced by private litigants).
410 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1803(a).
411 Id. § 12-12-1802(2).
412 The Massachusetts legislature, which considered but did not adopt an ALPR ban, was
far more explicit in identifying the privacy interest: “WHEREAS, such monitoring infringes
upon ‘the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s
public movements’ . . . .” S.B. 2141, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012)).
413 ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1802(3)(A).
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one for controlling access to secured areas.414 The question is whether these
exemptions make the law content based. The law enforcement exemption is
not problematic, because the First Amendment is concerned with state
discrimination between private actors, not distinctions between treatment of
private actors and law enforcement.415 The question with regards to the other
two exemptions is, therefore, whether they are consistent with or adequately
related to the government’s legitimate interest in protecting citizen privacy.416
Arguably, they are at least consistent with that interest: use of ALPRs to
control access to a secure location protects rather than offends privacy, and use
of ALPRs for parking enforcement is presumably done with the knowledge
and consent of the parking tenants. Both also limit the use of ALPRs to one
environment, so these exemptions pose a lesser privacy concern than persistent
tracking over space and time.
2.

Recording in Private Locations

The scope of the First Amendment right to record will and should be lesser
in private settings. Courts might adapt access case law or public employee case
law not to grant individuals a right to trespass, but to grant individuals who
have permission to be on the property a right to record while there.417 When
determining whether there is a right to record on nonpublic property, courts
should balance the extent to which the issue being recorded is a matter of
public concern against the privacy interests of the recorded individual.418
I discuss three examples of regulations of recording in private places where
such balancing might occur. Even in private spaces, however, when the
government specifically targets particular speech or speakers, the regulation
will be content based and subject to strict scrutiny. This is apparent in the
Idaho “ag-gag” law addressed below.
a.

The California Privacy Protection Act

The California Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (the “Paparazzi Act”)
protects individuals in their residences from a “constructive invasion of
privacy.”419 Originally, the Act banned trespass via technological means,
including through the use of a “visual or auditory enhancing device.”420 Since
2014, it has also protected against invasions of privacy by drone.421
414

Id. § 12-12-1803(b)(1)-(3).
ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 604 (7th Cir. 2012).
416 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529-30 (2014).
417 See generally McDonald, supra note 102.
418 See Whole Foods Market, Inc., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 87 (2015).
419 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2009).
420 See id.
421 See Act of Sept. 30, 2014, ch. 858, 2014 Cal. Stat. 5620 (changing the language
“visual or auditory device” to “any device”); DL Cade, California Updates Invasion of
Privacy Law to Ban the Use of Camera Drones, PETAPIXEL (Oct. 14, 2014),
415
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In 1999, Rodney Smolla and Erwin Chemerinsky debated the
constitutionality of this Act.422 Chemerinsky was instrumental in guiding its
enactment.423 Smolla argued that the Paparazzi Act was an example of contentbased regulation targeting paparazzi.424 Chemerinsky responded that the Act
did not target particular speakers, but instead it was a content-neutral
regulation of a particular type of behavior.425 Smolla eventually conceded this
point and deemed it “on the cusp between a content-based and content-neutral
law.”426 While Chemerinsky disavowed the existence of any real First
Amendment protection for newsgathering or recording itself,427 Smolla
characterized the Paparazzi Act as governing “acts of communication and
expression.”428 This disagreement between the two scholars is a microcosm of
current disagreements over the right to record.
What both appear to have agreed on is that at the core of the Paparazzi Act
lies a substantial government interest. For Chemerinsky, this is an interest in
“an extension of the concept of trespass,” enabling a person to successfully
“shut out the rest of the world.”429 And Smolla, while suggesting that courts
might first require a person to actively engage in that act of shutting out by
pulling down a window shade, conceded that “[i]f journalists were to use
sophisticated technology to somehow penetrate the walls of the building and
obtain audio recordings of everything that was done and said, this should
clearly be deemed intrusion.”430
In my view, Chemerinsky was right with respect to this particular law. He
called for an “explicit balancing” approach, weighing the speech right against
the privacy interest.431 While this is not appropriate for recording that occurs in
http://petapixel.com/2014/10/14/california-passes-law-banning-drones-protect-generalpublics-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/XW3Q-QGAW].
422 Compare Smolla, supra note 287, at 1106-16 (“To the extent that the intent and
operation of these laws focus on the traditional paparazzi, they violate current First
Amendment principles that prohibit singling out a certain class of speakers or a certain form
of media for specially disfavorable treatment.”), with Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing the
Rights of Privacy and the Press: A Reply to Professor Smolla, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1152,
1153-58 (1999) (“Unlike Professor Smolla, I believe that this law is clearly constitutional
because the interests in protecting privacy outweigh the First Amendment restrictions on the
gathering of information.”).
423
Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153.
424 Smolla, supra note 287, at 1113-14 (“The anti-paparazzi laws are manifestly contentbased laws, because they contain as a predicate element the perpetrator’s intent to sell or
transfer communicative material.”). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153.
425 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153.
426 Smolla, supra note 287, at 1107 n.38.
427 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1155-57.
428 Smolla, supra note 287, at 1112-13.
429 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153-54.
430 Smolla, supra note 287, at 1131.
431 Chemerinsky, supra note 422, at 1153, 1161.
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a public forum, in a private residence, it is a generous test. The Act is content
neutral; thus, the first question under my proposed approach is whether the
recording is on a matter of public concern. Without specific facts, this is
impossible to determine. Where there are specific facts, courts might look to
Snyder for an understanding of what constitutes a “matter of public
concern.”432 The government interest in protecting individuals in the home is
particularly high. Thus, the Paparazzi Act is likely constitutional, at least with
respect to its approach to constructive privacy invasions.433
b.

The Idaho Ag-Gag Law

Idaho enacted Idaho Code § 18-7042 in response to undercover video
investigations of animal abuse at factory farms.434 This “ag-gag” law prohibits,
among other things, entering “an agricultural production facility that is not
open to the public and, without the facility owner’s express consent . . . ,
mak[ing] audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural
production facility’s operations.”435 Federal litigation challenging this law is
ongoing; the district court held that it violates the First Amendment.436 Under
the balancing test that I propose for private spaces, this law would likely fail as
unconstitutional. The content being recorded is a classic matter of public
concern (i.e., food safety), and the government interest in protecting privacy,
even as defined here, is small, because food production is a heavily regulated
industry subject to inspection by outsiders.437 The types of behavioral shifts
that might occur at the factory due to undercover investigations are largely
desirable, driving compliance with consumer expectations about the treatment
of animals. They are not the type of behavioral shifts that justify banning
recording.
The Idaho ag-gag law, however, should be subjected not to a balancing test
but rather to strict scrutiny as a content-based law. It does not target a
particular location; it targets particular speech about “the conduct of an
agricultural production facility’s operations.”438 The legislative history also

432

See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 458 (2011) (explaining that “[s]peech deals
with matters of public concern” when it can be considered either a “political, social, or other
concern to the community,” or “when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest’” (citations
omitted)).
433 The Act is limited to photographs taken for commercial purposes. This could raise a
content-neutrality question.
434 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1199 (D. Idaho 2015);
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1015 (D. Idaho 2014).
435 IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(d) (2016).
436 See Otter, 118 F. Supp. at 1211-12.
437 Id. at 1201 (finding that the statute “seeks to limit and punish those who speak out on
topics relating to the agricultural industry, striking at the heart of important First
Amendment values”).
438 Id. at 1206 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1)(d)).
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shows that Idaho legislators specifically intended to target undercover
investigators and feared the effect of investigators’ videos on “the court of
public opinion,” and not an invasion of privacy.439 The law was aimed
precisely at the effect of the videos on the downstream listener and not at the
person managing privacy in the moment the video was taken. This makes it
classically content based.
c.

The School Case

My final example involves not a particular law, but unevenly applied school
policies. A district court judge in Maine recently analyzed whether a school
district’s refusal to let the parents of a nonverbal fourteen-year-old boy equip
himself with audio recording equipment to “tell” them about his day violated
the First Amendment right to record.440
The parents grew suspicious when their son came home crying one day, and
the school failed to explain what had caused his extensive distress.441 The
parents later observed unexplained bruises on their son’s forearms, consistent
with grab marks, and continued their attempt to have their son wear an audio
recording device.442 They were told that placing a recording device on their son
would violate state law, school rules, and the school district’s collective
bargaining agreement.443 Other disabled students, however, were permitted to
use audiorecording devices without measures to protect student privacy.444
School district representatives told the parents that the reason they had been
treated differently was because the parents “want to monitor the behavior of
school officials and employees, while the other students use recording devices
for school-sanctioned purposes.”445
The district court divided the First Amendment analysis into three steps:
first, it asked whether the First Amendment “even applies”; second, it looked
at the possibly applicable First Amendment standards; and third, it analyzed
the government’s justifications for the prohibition.446 The court found that the
First Amendment clearly applied to this activity, even though the controlling
case had taken place in a public forum while this case took place in a school.447
The court did not identify an applicable level of scrutiny, but concluded that
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Id. at 1200.
See Pollack v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 75, 12 F. Supp. 3d 173, 203 (D. Me. 2014).
441 Id. at 181.
442 Id. at 183.
443 Id. at 182.
444 Id. at 183.
445 Id.
446 See id. at 198-201 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 797 (1985)).
447 See id. at 198-99 (citing Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-84 (1st Cir. 2011)).
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even under the least protective level of scrutiny proposed by the defendants,
plaintiffs had made out a plausible claim for relief.448
The district court explained that the speech here involved a matter of public
concern, looking at “all the circumstances of the speech” under Snyder.449
Acknowledging that while most of what would be recorded would not involve
matters of public concern, the court concluded that any information confirming
the parents’ suspicions of abuse would be “serious enough to implicate
community concerns.”450 Even though the audience of the recordings would
likely be limited to the parents, the district court reasoned that the plaintiffs
would speak for the son in the broader community, making the recordings
essential for conversations about matters of public concern.451
Then the court asked whether the regulation was “viewpoint neutral and
reasonable,” which is the test applied to regulations of speech in nonpublic
forums and the test suggested by the defendants.452 The court did not address
the reasonableness of the regulation, concluding instead that the plaintiffs had
plausibly alleged viewpoint discrimination.453 Their request to audio-record
their son’s day was denied because the school did not want its officials to be
monitored, while other students were allowed to record.454
Using the framework proposed here (and assuming that schools would be
treated like other non-public fora, although there is a distinct standard for
school speech), the district court should have, at the initial stage, weighed the
speech interest in the recording against the alleged government interest in
protecting privacy. The court was correct that the desired recordings would
have implicated a matter of public concern, namely student safety. The court
was also correct that the government interest in protecting student privacy was
noticeably weak, because the school allowed other students to audio record at
school, with no attempts to protect student privacy. The case was, thus,
contextually rightly decided.
CONCLUSION
The right to record presents significant challenges to First Amendment
doctrine. It is, however, just one example of the speech-related questions that
arise as the digital world increasingly entwines with the physical world.
Analysis of speech rights will, by necessity, become more and more
contextual. This will be a challenge for courts, which currently face a blunt
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See id. at 200-01.
Id. at 200 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011)).
Id. at 201.
Id.
Id. (citing Del Gallo v. Parent, 557 F.3d 58, 72 (1st Cir. 2009)).
Id.
Id.
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version of the First Amendment, and for scholars, who are tempted to address
each new question as a simplified problem of First Amendment coverage.
Recording technologies are not new communications media; they are
expressive activity occurring in physical space. This discussion of the right to
record shows that if we carefully identify the nature of the harms a speech right
causes, First Amendment doctrine need not be completely disrupted. There is
more room within the doctrine than recent Supreme Court pronouncements
might indicate. First Amendment case law is replete with more nuanced
understandings of privacy than commonly understood. The understanding of
privacy harms unpacked in this Article, involving the disruption of
sociophysical spaces in which individuals manage their social accessibility, is
applicable to other legal contexts. From policy discussions of police-worn
body cameras, to Fourth Amendment discussions concerning public
surveillance systems, to discussions of whether to allow cameras at the
Supreme Court, existing First Amendment doctrine in fact—and to many,
surprisingly—helps explain the strength of the relevant privacy interests.

